A special proceeding pursuant to New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (“CPLR”) Article 78, specifically Section 7803(3), is the vehicle for challenging determinations of a body or officer. Section 7803(3) sets forth the all-too-familiar question raised: whether the determination was arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or contrary to law. In the land
Restrictive covenants are common conditions of zoning approvals. Municipal boards typically require applicants to record restrictive covenants as a condition of approval. These restrictive covenants are drafted to “run with the land,” meaning the covenants automatically transfer with the property.
Generally, restrictive covenants are enforceable in New York, provided they are reasonable and benefit all property owners in the community and are not inconsistent with public policy or violate a property owner’s rights. See, Deak v. Heathcote Association, 191 AD2d 617 (2d Dept 1993) (party seeking extinguishment of the restrictive covenants must prove (1) lack of benefit derived from enforcement of the restriction, and (2) legally cognizable reason for the extinguishment of the restriction under RPAPL 1951, such as “changed conditions” which render the purpose of the restriction incapable of being accomplished).
Continue Reading Restrictive Covenants: The Devil Is in the Details…
OVERVIEW
The Shawangunk Ridge is a cluster of bedrock in upstate New York popular for its scenery and outdoor recreation. The Town of Gardiner’s (“Gardiner”) Shawangunk Ridge Protection District (“SRPD”) protects the scenic and ecological values of the Shawangunk Ridge and requires, among other things, a special use permit for development.
A property owner sought to subdivide and develop property situated within the SRPD; to wit: subdivide a 108-acre lot into two lots, maintain an existing dwelling on one lot, and construct a new dwelling on the second lot. The developer sought and obtained a special use permit and subdivision approval from the Gardiner Planning Board (“Planning Board”). Before the approval, the Planning Board issued a negative declaration pursuant to the N.Y. State Environmental Quality Review Act (“SEQRA”). Notably, the owner himself, a trained biologist and forestry professional, performed his own conservation analysis with respect to the Planning Board’s SEQRA review.
The Friends of the Shawangunks, an environmental conservation organization (“Friends”), commenced an Article 78 proceeding challenging the special use permit, subdivision approval, and negative declaration. The Supreme Court, Ulster County, dismissed the proceeding on the grounds that Friends lacked standing, and Friends appealed. On appeal, the Third Department reversed, held Friends had standing, and addressed the merits.
Continue Reading Friend of the Shawangunks v. Town of Gardiner Planning Board: Litigation Concerning a Popular Outdoor Recreation Area Prompts the Third Department to Address Organizational Standing, Special Permit Criteria, and Whether Expert “Bias” is a Consideration Under SEQRA
In Matter of Marcus v. Planning Board of the Village of Wesley Hills, et al., the respondent, Rockland Tree Expert, Inc., d/b/a Ira Wickes, Arborist (“Wickes”), sought a special use permit and site plan approval to conduct arborist and landscaping services and to operate a nursery on its property located within the Village of
Petitioner, Claude Simon (“Petitioner”), owns approximately 2.25 acres of property in the Village of Upper Nyack (the “Village”), which he sought to subdivide into two separate lots. The first lot would contain the existing dwelling and other existing improvements. The vacant second lot would be improved with a single-family dwelling. However, the Village advised Petitioner
In Cady v Town of Germantown Planning Bd., 2020 NY Slip Op 03440 [3d Dept 2020], the Appellate Division, Third Department, reversed the Columbia County Supreme Court’s judgment annulling site plan approval, and dismissed the Article 78 petition. Among other things, the Court’s decision addressed whether the Planning Board exceeded its authority and
How and when to challenge multiple municipal actions regarding a single project often perplexes Article 78 litigants. Varying statutes of limitations may apply to actions taken at various stages for one project, and the judicial concepts of finality and ripeness affect the viability of a challenge. For example, a litigant must challenge a lead agency’s
In Matter of Pittsford Canalside Props., LLC v Village of Pittsford Zoning Bd. of Appeals, et al., the Fourth Department held that settlement correspondence between a development firm, Pittsford Canalside Properties, LLC (“PCP” or “Petitioner”), and the Village of Pittsford Architectural Preservation and Review Board (the “ARB”), was not an enforceable settlement agreement.
PCP
A recent Second Department decision, Matter of Village of Kiryas Joel v County of Orange, et al., addresses the intriguing justiciability doctrine of ripeness, as applied to judicial review of municipal administrative action.
In 2007, Orange County (the “County”) acquired property known as Camp LaGuardia from the New York City Economic Development Corporation. Originally,
A recent decision from the Supreme Court of Warren County, John Carr v. Village of Lake George Village Board, demonstrates how a simple omission on a site plan approval application can upend an approved project, even though the municipality wants the project and enacted a local law to smooth the pathway for its approval.