Week to week we blog about recent developments in the land use arena, which typically arise in the civil context.  This week, we thought a recent “criminal” case decided by the Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, was not only particularly interesting, but also, the topic of illegal rental permits is one that many land use practitioners grapple with multiple times during their legal careers.

On October 26, 2017, the Appellate Term decided People v Makrides, 2017 NY Slip Op 51442 (U).  In Makrides, the Village Code Enforcement Officer alleged that on August 20, 2014, he visited property located on Beach Street.  The door was answered by an individual who identified himself as a renter and of no relation to the owner, Marie Makrides, with Beach Street Properties.   Based on a further review of rental permit records, and the lack thereof, the Code Enforcement Officer issued an Information alleging that Makrides was in violation of Village Code Section 205-4, failure to obtain a rental occupancy permit.

The Code Enforcement Officer visited the property again on November 5, 2014; except for the testimony of the alleged renter, the Code Enforcement Officer found the property to again be in violation of  the rental occupancy permit ordinance.

Makrides’ attorney moved to dismiss the accusatory instruments for facial insufficiency (CPL 100.15; 100.40).  Specifically, it was argued that the accusatory instruments “failed to contain facts of an evidentiary nature . . . and that they” were improperly based upon hearsay allegations. The Justice Court denied the motion.

After a non-jury trial, the Court found Makrides to be in violation of the rental permit ordinance and fined her $5,000.00 for each charge.  Makrides appealed.

The Appellate Term reversed both convictions, finding that facial insufficiency is a nonwaivable jurisdictional prerequisite to a criminal prosecution (CPL 100.40).  Finding that the statement made by the renter to be hearsay, and not supported by a deposition, it was an error for the Justice Court to rely on said testimony.  The testimony of the renter is clearly an out of court statement introduced in court for the truth of the matter at hand, to wit; classic hearsay testimony.

Consequently, the Appellate Term held that without said hearsay testimony, the Informations alleging that the defendant failed to obtain a rental occupancy permit –  without saying why it was necessary for her to obtain one – failed to contain “factual allegations . . .  through nonhearsay allegations . . . of the offense charged and defendant’s commission thereof.”

Abiding by principles of judicial restraint, the Court declined to make a further finding that the Port Jefferson Village Rental Permit Ordinance was unconstitutional.  It did, however, require the Village to remit, if paid, the combined $10,000.00 fine to the defendant.

On July 11, 2016, we authored Part One in an ongoing series discussing the mechanics of  how to successfully record a deed in the State of New York, wherein we discussed the various types of ownership interests and how they should be correctly reflected.

On August 22, 2016, we authored Part Two in the series discussing how to successfully prepare and record a deed in the State of New York, wherein we discussed no consideration deed transfers and the importance of starting every transaction by securing a copy of the recorded deed from the County Clerk’s Office, not from your client or anyone else.

Today, we offer Part Three in the series – – 10 Fail-Safe Tips To Achieve Success:

Before we begin, although some of the tips below may seem rudimentary, rest assured I spend quite a bit of time providing answers to these questions:

  1. Ensure that you identify all buyers’ and sellers’ physical addresses.  PO Boxes are not acceptable, as you cannot reside in a box.  If you don’t know the physical address, write the street name of the property being transferred and indicate there is no number assigned to the property,  such as “No # Main Street, Islip” for a property being transferred in the Town of Islip.  Deed physical addresses are not used for billing purposes or tax billing purposes.  This is more a form over substance arcane requirement.
  2. Deeds are only signed by sellers, unless the buyer is assuming a mortgage.  As such, if you have two sellers and one buyer who is assuming a mortgage, than all parties must sign; and all signatures must be notarized.
  3. If the seller is a corporation, partnership, LLC or other type of business entity, the seller’s official capacity must be disclosed – i.e Jane Smith, managing member, or Jane Smith, President.
  4. If the notary public is related to any party, but not a party or beneficiary of the transaction, best practices would suggest that you find another notary.  However, mere familial relation to a notary does not, per se, disqualify the notary.  Most practitioners will frown upon this, although it is perfectly acceptable.
  5. There is a little know secret that pursuant to Real Property Law Section 309-a, a notary is not required to actually witness the person signing the deed.  In other words, if Jane Smith signs the deed in front of her friend John Smith, and John Smith (who is not a party to the transaction) tells the notary that he witnessed Jane Smith sign the deed, then the notary may take the signature of Jane Smith.  This is called a Subscribing Witness Form of notarization.  The caveat here is that the notary  must be personally acquainted with the subscribing witness.  In this example, John Smith is the subscribing witness, with whom the notary must be personally acquainted.    Likewise, if a subscribing witness notary signature is taken, a different notary jurat, found under section 309-a, must be used.
  6. Most deeds today state that the consideration for the transfer is “ten dollars and other valuable consideration.”  This is perfectly acceptable, except in the case of an executor’s deed.  Every executor’s deed must state the full and accurate consideration, together with the date of the seller’s death and the county where the death occurred and the will was probated.  If there is no will, the same information applies to an administrative proceeding.
  7. Every deed should contain a recital called a “being and intended to be clause.”  Quite frankly, these clauses have significant meaning.  For instance, if a typographical error occurs in the deed’s legal description, by including a “being and intended to be clause”, in most cases a corrected deed will not be required if the source of the transfer is indicated to be from a prior deed, and the prior deed’s legal description had been correct.  This can have a serious cost saving effect, given the exorbitant filing fees charged by Nassau and Suffolk Counties these days.
  8. Although I have been guilty of this faux pas myself, always sign deed documents in black ink.
  9. Even though most deed forms request a witness signature next to the signer’s (grantor’s) name, such as “in the presence of” or “witness here”, no such witness signature is required.
  10. Just as there is a subscribing witness notary jurat, there is also an out-of-state notary jurat.  Ensure that if you are sending a deed out of state to be signed that an out-of-state notary jurat is included on the deed.

I hope this list of seemingly easy to remember tips is helpful for lawyers and paralegals alike.  Stay tuned for an in-depth review of how to properly complete those all-encompassing transfer documents, such as the New York State TP-584 form, RP-5217 form, Community Preservation Tax Form and some interesting affidavits for mortgage tax reductions, such as the 253 Affidavit and 255 Affidavit.

 

On June 28, 2017, the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that a tenant has standing to challenge the definition of “Family” as set forth in the Freeport Village Code.

In Tomasulo v. Village of Freeport, ___A.D.3d___, the Village commenced a criminal proceeding against non-party property owner, William Goodhue, Jr. (owner), alleging that the tenancy between Tomasulo (tenant) and the owner violated sections 171-1 and 210-3 of the Freeport Village Code. The tenant had resided in a single family home with the owner of the home and two other non-related persons. This arrangement violated the definition of “Family” in the Village Code. As a result of the criminal proceeding, the owner commenced an eviction proceeding against Tomasulo.

In response to the eviction proceeding, Tomasulo commenced an Article 78 proceeding against the Village challenging the constitutionality of the definition of “Family” contained in Village Code sections 171-1 and 210-3.  The trial court converted the Article 78 proceeding to a complaint and granted the Village’s motion for summary judgment holding that Tomasulo lacked standing to seek a declaration as to the “constitutionality of the disputed portions of the Village Code” because Tomasulo had “not been injured or threatened with injury as a result of those provisions . . . and [Tomasulo] failed to adequately allege the existence of a justiciable controversy.”

In reversing the trial court, the Second Department stated that Tomasulo “demonstrated a ‘threatened injury to [his] protected right’ to his tenancy in the owner’s house . . . such that he has adequately shown ‘an interest sufficient to constitute standing to maintain the action.'”

Finding that Tomasulo’s pending eviction proceeding demonstrated a “present, rather than hypothetical, contingent or remote, prejudice to [him] . . . [the Court declared that the] Village did not establish, prima facie, its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.”

 

two housesOn April 5, 2017, in an Article 78 proceeding, Tavano v. Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Patterson, 2017 NY Slip Op 02661, the Second Department reversed a trial court decision and reinstated a decision of the Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Patterson.  The zoning board had granted petitioner Tavano’s application to establish a legal non-conforming use of a second building on his property, referred to as the “cottage.”

Tavano argued that the cottage located at his property was a leased residential dwelling and that its use preexisted the Town’s 1942 zoning ordinance, which provided that “a building, structure, or premises could be used as a rooming or boarding house so long as there were no more than three boarders or roomers.”  Id.

In reversing the trial court’s finding, the Appellate Division noted that petitioner owned property in Brewster that is improved with a single family dwelling constructed in 1947 and a cottage constructed in 1955.  Tavano lived in the single family dwelling and rented the cottage.

Although the Appellate Division did not affirmatively state that its decision rested on the fact that the cottage was constructed in 1955, well after the 1942 zoning ordinance was enacted, and thus, Tavano could not establish entitlement to a legal nonconforming use, the Court did state that “to establish a legal nonconforming use, a property owner must demonstrate that the allegedly preexisting use was legal prior to the enactment of the zoning ordinance that purportedly rendered it nonconforming.”

Here, and without benefit of the trial court opinion, it appears that the relevant question was not only whether the cottage was constructed prior to enactment of the 1942 ordinance, but also whether Tavano’s use of the cottage constituted use as a rooming or boarding house.

In reinstating the zoning  board’s decision, the Appellate Division relied upon the long-standing legal principle that ‘[t]he determination of a zoning board regarding the continuation of a preexisting nonconfirming use must be sustained if it is rational and supported by substantial evidence, even if the reviewing court would have reached a different result”

Consequently, and as all land use lawyers will attest, even if the trial court or reviewing court would have reached a different result than that zoning board, deference is to be afforded to the zoning board.  Finding that the “ZBA’s determination that the cottage did not constitute a rooming or boarding house under the 1942 zoning ordinance was not arbitrary or capricious”, the Appellate Division reversed the trial court and reinstated the zoning board’s decision.

office spaceOn February 20, 2017, our colleagues blogged about Ader v. Guzman, 135 AD3d 668 [2d Dept. 2016] and a guidance letter subsequently issued by the NYS Department of State (NYSDOS). At issue was the responsibility of a real estate broker to have a working knowledge of the property being marketed, including land use and zoning restrictions. The Court held that a broker has no duty to investigate whether there is a valid rental permit for the residential rental property. The NYSDOS, which licenses real estate brokers and salespersons in New York, reached a different conclusion, noting that the failure of a broker to have a working knowledge of the site could violate the broker’s obligations under the Real Property Law §§ 441 and 441-c.

On Wednesday, March 29, 2017, we presented a program to the Commercial Industrial Broker Society of Long Island (CIBS) about Land Use and Environmental Pitfalls for Real Estate Agents and Brokers that dealt with the Ader/NYSDOS issue. We also discussed NYS’s Tenant Notification Law and other potential environmental and land use traps that could adversely impact realtors.  Please click here for a copy of our power point presentation.  We hope you enjoy it!

mosqueOn December 31, 2016, U.S. District Judge Michael Shipp of the District of New Jersey authored a 57-page opinion granting partial summary judgment to plaintiffs, The Islamic Society of Basking Ridge (“Islamic Society”) holding that defendants, the Township of Bernards (“Bernards”), violated Islamic Society’s rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”).  The Bernards Planning Board denied Islamic Society’s site plan application seeking to construct a mosque in a residential zone on the basis that (1) a mosque is not considered a church under Bernards’ zoning code and (2)  Bernards’ parking ordinance was not adhered to.

FACTS

In November 2011, Islamic Society purchased property in a residential section of Bernards with the intention of constructing a 4,252 square foot mosque on the property.  The site plan called for 50 parking spaces based on estimated occupancy of 150 people.  The parking spaces provided were in compliance with Bernards’ parking ordinance applicable to churches at a ratio of 3:1 .

Over the course of three and a half years, Islamic Society’s site plan application underwent 39 meetings and was subjected to intense neighborhood opposition and scrutiny.    According to the decision, competing expert testimony was provided by parking experts and asserted that although Bernards does not, and has never, relied on the Institute of Transportation Engineers (“ITE”)  Parking Generation data,  Bernards required Islamic Society to apply the ITE data applicable to mosques, which estimated required parking spaces between 36 and 110.  Bernards compromised at 107 parking spaces, when in fact, only 50 were required under Bernards accepted church parking ratio of 3:1.

The rationale for the increased parking requirement rested on Bernards’ determination that a mosque is not a church, despite the fact that Bernards’ zoning code does not state that a mosque is not considered a church.  Bernards did not stop there.  Bernards went on to say that only Christian places of worship are considered  churches, and as a result thereof, not only was the 3:1 parking ratio not applicable to Islamic Society’s site plan application, but also, Bernards maintained discretion in reviewing Islamic Society’s application and essentially had unfettered discretion in determining parking requirements.

At the conclusion of all hearings and testimony, Bernards’ planning board denied the site plan application.  Islamic Society commenced an action in federal court alleging violations under RLUIPA.

DECISION

In granting partial summary judgment, the Court rejected Bernards’ position that mosques are not considered churches.   In fact, the Court specifically stated that a mosque or any place of religious worship, whether a church or not, is protected under RLUIPA.  Bernards’ unsupported determination that mosques are not considered churches violated Islamic Society’s rights under the Nondiscrimination Provision of RLUIPA.

Additionally, with respect to the increased parking, and Bernards’ position that it maintained unfettered discretion to determine parking requirements, the Court relied upon its determination that a mosque is entitled to the same protections as a church;  as such, the Bernard parking ordinance ratio of 3:1 should have been applied equally to Islamic Society as it had historically been applied to Christian and Baptist churches and synagogues that were previously approved in Bernards.  Further, the Christian, Baptist and Jewish places of worship were typically granted in less than six months, and in most instances, with less then four public hearings.

CONCLUSION

The decision in this 57-page case cannot be justly analyzed in a short blog post.  Given the state of our country at this time, when it comes to freedom of religion and the consequences that we suffer as a result of our differing beliefs, it would be a worthwhile allocation of any land use attorney’s time to read this decision.  If nothing else, it reminds us all that one of the basic tenets of our American freedoms is the freedom to be different and be accepted.

logo-colorBefore we blog our way into 2017, we wanted to take a moment to review the topics that we blogged about in 2016 and to remind our readers that the land use practice group at Farrell Fritz is a diverse group of attorneys, which is why the topics that we blog about are quite diverse.

For example, it is not uncommon for our practice group to be involved in a large-scale transactional development project, while at the same time, we are drafting or answering an order to show cause; drafting easement agreements; exploring an adverse possession claim; resolving environmental issues; preparing, presenting and defending applications; and litigating our way through a criminal zoning code violation.   Our diverse legal talents are reflected in the topics that we chose to blog about in 2016.

We started the 2016 blogging year, for example, discussing riparian rights, climate change,  e-waste regulationsPine Barrens credits and renewable energy.  As the spring and summer approached, we tackled summer rental laws and the controversial role that Air BnB plays in short-term rentals.  During this time, we also blogged about the increasing presence of Vape stores on Long Island and how municipalities are tackling Vape store land use regulations.

One very popular 2016 topic in the land use community focused on the use of Drones and Drone regulation.   We will, of course, follow this developing topic in 2017, so be on the lookout for our Drone updates.favicon

Likewise, and always a controversial land use topic, is the use of moratoriums. Last year we blogged about the Village of Patchogue’s and the Village of Sag Harbor’s use of moratoriums to slow Village development.   We also addressed the hot topic of “zombie houses” by discussing not only what a “zombie house” is, but also blogged about legislation at the state, county and local levels aimed at combating the increasing number of zombie homes and decreasing the negative impact that these homes have on our communities.

 And, always relevant topics in the land use arena, we blogged about easements, SEQRA, farmland preservation, special permits and variances, the Hamptons helicopter route, rezoning the East End in Moriches and Eastport, General Municipal Law 239-m referrals, and non-conforming uses.

Finally, no year in review would be complete without mention of Facebook and the pitfalls that all litigants face when they take to social media during the pendency of a  land use lawsuit.  Check out our post on the monetary and other sanctions that the Village of Pomona suffered.

The above is just a quick snapshot of the topics that we blogged about in 2016.   We will kick off 2017 next Monday, January 9, 2016 with our new year’s post by Charlotte A. Biblow, Esq.   We hope you enjoyed our year in review and that in the coming year, you will help us increase our readership by forwarding our posts to your colleagues and friends and inviting them to subscribe to our weekly blog by email.

Happy New Year to all.

Monopole-TowerB1On December 21, 2016, the Appellate Division, Second Department, rendered yet another decision whereby an appeal was dismissed “as academic” on the grounds that during the pendency of the appeal, the land use development project that was the subject of the lawsuit/appeal was completed.

In Bruenn v. Town Board of the Town of Kent, 2014-07666 (2d Dept., December 21, 2016), petitioners/appellants Bruenn commenced a hybrid proceeding pursuant to CPLR Article 78 seeking a declaration that two (2) 2013 resolutions adopted by the Kent Town Board authorizing construction and operation of a 150-foot monopole wireless communications tower were null and void.    The trial court dismissed the hybrid proceeding holding that the resolutions were not null and void.  Bruenn appealed.

During the pendency of the appeal, construction of the monopole was completed by defendant, Homeland Towers, LLC (“Homeland”).  As a result thereof, in or around September 2015, Homeland made a motion to dismiss the appeal on the grounds that Bruenn’s claims were rendered moot by construction and completion of the monopole.   Although the Appellate Division initially held the motion in abeyance and referred it to the three panel of justices charged with determining the underlying appeal, the panel ultimately determined that a decision on the merits of Bruenn’s claims was academic, as Bruenn failed to seek preliminary injunctive relief, and as a result, Homeland’s motion to dismiss the appeal on mootness grounds was granted.

This decision reminds practitioners of the important role that preliminary injunctions play in land use development disputes.  Failure to seek injunctive relief at the outset will, in most cases, preclude review of the merits of the appeal.   In Bruenn, the Court stated that Bruenn’s explanation that monetary constraints precluded Bruenn from moving for injunctive relief was unavailing.  It is well established law that failure to seek an injunction stopping a project at its earliest stages will result in a mootness defense so long as the continued construction is not performed in bad faith or without authority.  Id.   Moreover, it was established that the work performed by Homeland could not readily be undone without substantial hardship.  Since construction of the monopole was an isolated event, not subject to “recurring novel or substantial issues that are sufficiently evanescent to evade review otherwise,” the Appellate Division granted Homeland’s motion to dismiss and as a result, rendered any determination on the merits “academic.”  Id.

land bankAlthough the use of land banks has been in existence for many years in other states, it was not until after the New York real estate market collapsed in or around 2008  that the New York State Legislature enacted the 2011 New York State Land Bank Act (“Land Bank Act”). 

The Land Bank Act authorizes local governments with taxing authority, and thus foreclosure powers,  to create and administer not-for-profit land bank corporations, whose primary purpose is to purchase, lease, sell, demolish and/or  revitalize blighted properties,  otherwise known as “zombie properties,” in an effort to return these properties to a profitable and purposeful  use.

There are presently fifteen land banks across New York State, with three additional land banks in the works.  Suffolk County formed one of the first land banks, known as the Suffolk County Land Bank Corporation (‘SCLBC’), in 2013.   The initial primary purpose of the SCLBC was to purchase brownfields properties.  In 2016, however, the SCLBC announced that it is entering a pilot program designed to purchase approximately eleven zombie homes in the Brookhaven, Islip and Babylon areas.  The Nassau County Land Bank Corporation advises that it will focus on purchasing some 1,956 blighted residential and zombie properties throughout Nassau County.

In October 2016, the New York State Comptroller’s Office issued a 22-page summary defining the purpose of the Land Bank Act, while also providing a candid discussion of the monetary pitfalls facing land banks. The summary questioned whether land banks will be effective in not only combating blight and providing necessary revitalization, but also in securing the funds necessary to foster their longevity.

Presently, land banks are primarily funded by subsidies and grants.  As the cost of purchasing, carrying, demolishing and/or renovating blighted properties can be extraordinarily high, without tax abatements or partnerships with local and state governments, land banks are not generating sufficient profits to reinvest in other blighted properties.   The consequence is that the process of redevelopment is  slow moving and uncertain.

Contrary to the New York State Comptroller’s October 2016 summary,  on November 1, 2016, the New York State Attorney General’s Office issued a 26-page report entitled “Revitalizing NY State, A report on New York Attorney General Eric T. Schneiderman’s Land Bank Community Revitalization Initiative”  (“AG Initiative”).  The AG Initiative states that the Initiative “is helping communities across New York State address vacancy and blight . . . [and] is advancing efforts to rebound from the housing and economic crisis.”  Id.

The AG Initiative further reports that “[o]ver the past three years, my office has committed more than $30 million through two competitive rounds of funding to help kick-start these vital community-based organizations, enabling them to get down to the business of rebuilding communities.”  Id.  The first competitive rounds of funding arose from a financial settlement with large banks involved in the mortgage crisis known as the “National Mortgage Settlement.” See  New York State Comptroller’s Office Report, October 2016, supra.

According to the AG Initiative, as a result of recent settlements with two more banks, an additional $20 million is expected to be available shortly for distribution to the existing land banks.  Id.

For the time being, although land banks rely primarily on funds provided from settlements between the New York State Attorney General’s Office and banks, land banks remain in a tenuous financial predicament.  The future success of these land banks relies heavily on their ability to increase grant availability  and to find inventive ways to turn a profit more quickly.

 

thOn July 11, 2016 and August 22, 2016, we blogged about how to successfully prepare and record a deed in the State of New York.  Just a few days ago, a question arose as to whether joint tenants with rights of survivorship can hold title to real property in unequal interests.  Although I emphatically stated in our July 11, 2016 post that joint tenants can only hold title in equal shares, I wavered in my answer when I was met with opposition by others who emphatically stated that joint tenants can, in fact, hold title in unequal interests.  So this blog post is intended to set the record straight.  Under New York State law, persons holding title to real property as joint tenants with rights of survivorship must hold title in equal interests.

The three types of real property ownership interests consist of (1) tenants by the entirety, reserved to married couples only, which by its terms creates a survivorship interest in each party; (2) joint tenants, which creates a survivorship interest between the parties, and must be clearly stated on the deed in order for the joint tenancy to exist; and (3) tenants in common, which creates no survivorship interest between the parties and is typically used when friends or persons other than married or familial parties purchase, most often, investment properties.  When a deed is silent as to the ownership interest, such as John Doe and Mary Smith, unless John Doe and Mary Smith are married, the law presumes that the parties intended to create a tenancy in common, with no survivorship interest between the parties.

And, to further set the record straight – the term “joint tenants with rights of survivorship” is a misnomer.  The legal term “joint tenants” provides each titled owner with the right of survivorship.  Consequently, when drafting a deed, indicating the ownership interest between the parties as “joint tenants” is sufficient to create a right of survivorship between the parties.  (See EPTL 6-2.2).  Having said that, when creating a joint tenancy between parties, attorneys routinely indicate ownership interests as “joint tenants with rights of survivorship.”

Understanding the three types of ownership interests becomes of utmost importance when multiple parties take title to real property.  For example, in the State of New York, if John Smith and Mary Smith, his wife, take title to real property together with their children Jack Smith and Meg Smith, the interest created here is an undivided 50% ownership interest in the property by John and Mary Smith and a 25% tenant in common interest to each child, Jack and Meg.  The tenant in common ownership interest arises because the deed is silent as to the ownership interests among all four parties.  Upon the death of husband John, Mary remains a 50% owner; and her two children, Jack and Meg, each own the remaining 25%, all as tenants in common.

This scenario would change in the event that Jack, the son, was to die first.  In this instance, John and Mary Smith, husband and wife, remain 50% owners, Meg remains a 25% owner, and the heirs of Jack inherit his 25% interest.  If the deed had read:  “John Smith and Mary Smith, husband and wife, and Jack Smith and Meg Smith, as joint tenants with rights of survivorship”, then each of the parties, regardless of the spousal relationship, would own 25%.  Upon the death of any owner, the surviving parties would equally inherit the decedent’s share.  If Meg were to pass on first, then John’s, Mary’s and Jack’s interests would increase to 1/3 each.

There are numerous examples of cases where the ownership interests of the parties are disputed.  In most cases, the language set forth in the deed by the attorney draftsman is the cause of the litigation.   In reconfirming that joint tenants must hold equal ownership interests, I came across a 1996 Westchester County, Supreme Court case, Prario v. Novo 168 Misc.2d 610, whereby the trial court not only sets out the law, but also provides great examples of who owns what in specific ownership scenarios.  Most drafting mistakes arise when individuals hold title along with married couples.  To avoid creating an ownership interest that the parties did not anticipate, the drafter must carefully read the language set forth in the deed to ensure that the interests created are, in fact, the interests that the parties desire.  Perhaps printing out a copy of Prario, supra, will assist in avoiding critical ownership interest mistakes.

One footnote:  The joint tenant equal ownership interest theory does not necessarily mean that in a partition action, or action for divorce, each party will walk away with equal monetary amounts.  We will leave that discussion for another day!