Several Long Island municipalities have local laws that peg the issuance of certain building permits to a requirement that contractors and subcontractors be participants in a “qualified apprenticeship program” that is registered and approved by the New York State Department of Labor. While these provisions are often entitled “safe and code compliant construction” and may be perceived as fostering apprenticeship programs for building construction trades, many contractors on Long Island disagree.

They see these provisions as having nothing to do with safety or compliance. They point out that many of these codes do not require that apprentices work on the project or that the selected contractor even employ such apprentices. Rather, all that is required is that the contractor have a collective bargaining agreement with a union that has a qualified apprenticeship program. They contend that these code provisions are aimed at ensuring that contractors affiliated with certain unions get the jobs by prohibiting non-unionized contractors or unionized contractors with affiliated unions that do not meet the qualified apprenticeship program requirement from getting building permits. And they further argue that these provisions add significant costs to the price of construction.

A recent decision by a federal judge may be changing that. But first, a sampling of codes provisions on Long Island that require qualified apprenticeship programs for building permits.

Town of Huntington

Section 87-55.1 of the Huntington Town Code provides that prior to the issuance of “building permits for the construction of commercial buildings of at least one hundred thousand (100,000) square feet,” applicants must “demonstrate that any general contractor, contractor or subcontractor for such project, must have apprenticeship agreements appropriate for the type and scope of work to be performed, which have been registered with, and approved by, the New York State Commissioner of Labor in accordance with Article 23 of the New York Labor Law.”

Town of Brookhaven

Section 16-3.1 of the Brookhaven Town Code requires that prior to the issuance of  “foundation permits and building permits for the construction of a building located in commercial and industrial zoning districts where the square footage of the footprint is 100,000 square feet or greater” and prior to the issuance of building permits for “an addition to an existing building located in commercial and industrial zoning districts when such addition is 100,000 square feet or greater,” that the applicant “demonstrate that any general contractor, contractor or subcontractor for such project participates in an approved apprenticeship training program(s) appropriate for the type and scope of work to be performed, that has been registered with, and approved by, the New York State Department of Labor in accordance with Article 23 of the New York Labor Law.”

Under Brookhaven’s code provision, unless an existing building has a certificate of occupancy or its equivalent, the square footage of the existing building is included in the calculation of the 100,000 square foot threshold.

Town of North Hempstead

Section 24-68 of the North Hempstead Town Code provides the following. “Every contractor or subcontractor who is a party to, or working under, a construction contract with the Town shall be a participant in good standing in a qualified apprenticeship program that is registered with and approved by the DOL and shall have in place apprenticeship agreements that specifically identify or pertain to the trade(s) and/or job title(s) called for within the construction contract.”

Section 2-9.1 of the North Hempstead Code requires that prior to issuance of a building permit for a “large commercial project,” the applicant must demonstrate that “any general contractor, contractor or subcontractor for such project is a participant in good standing in a qualified apprenticeship program that is registered with and approved by the DOL and has apprenticeship agreements, which are specifically identified as pertaining to the trade(s) and/or job title(s) called for by such project.”

A “large commercial project” is defined as “[t]he erection, construction, enlargement, alteration, removal, improvement, renovation, demolition or conversion of a commercial building or structure where such erection, construction, enlargement, alteration, removal, improvement, renovation, demolition or conversion involves an area of 100,000 square feet or more of floor area. The threshold of 100,000 square feet may be met either in a single building or a collection of buildings located on the same property.”

City of Long Beach

Section 7-48 of the City of Long Beach Code of Ordinances covers apprenticeship requirements. It provides that “as a condition precedent for, the issuance of all building permits…for construction of buildings of at least 100,000 square feet…any contractor or subcontractor, who is a party to, or working under, a construction contract, [must] be a participant in good standing of a qualified apprenticeship program that is registered with and approved by the New York State Department of Labor and to have apprenticeship agreements…which have been registered with, and approved by, the New York State Commissioner of Labor in accordance with Article 23 of the New York Labor Law.”

Town of Oyster Bay

Section 93-16.3 of the Town of Oyster Bay Town Code requires that any contractor or subcontractor who is performing construction on any “structures used for purposes other than private one- or two-family residences, and shall include, without limitation, buildings used for offices, retail or wholesale stores, warehouses, schools, and public buildings” shall “be a participant in good standing of a qualified apprenticeship program that is registered with and approved by the New York State Department of Labor and to have apprenticeship agreements, as evidenced by valid D.O.L. certificates of completion which are specifically identified as pertaining to the trade(s) and/or job title(s) necessary for said construction project.”

Sections 93-16.1 and 93-16.2 apply this provision to buildings of 100,000 square feet or more, and have other refinements to that 100,000 square foot threshold.

 Legal Challenge to Oyster Bay Provision

A legal challenge to Oyster Bay’s provisions is pending in the federal court in Central Islip. That case is entitled Hartcorn Plumbing and Heating, Inc. v Town of Oyster Bay.  Plaintiffs contend that Oyster Bay’s code is unconstitutional as it applies not just to contracts that the Town is a party to or funds, but also applies to wholly private contracts.

On February 7, 2018, Judge Hurley issued a preliminary injunction, enjoining the Town of Oyster Bay from enforcing Town Code 93-16.3, with respect to any contract that the Town of Oyster Bay is not a “direct or indirect party.” As a result, at least for now, projects that do not involve the Town of Oyster Bay as a party to the contract or are not funded by the town can get building permits without demonstrating that their contractors participate in “qualified apprenticeship programs.” Whether that ruling is ultimately upheld as the case proceeds is unknown, but it may result in other municipalities reexamining their code provisions voluntarily or as a result of similar court challenges.

At its December 5, 2017 meeting, the Town Board of the Town of Southold (“Town Board”) was hit with a tidal wave of opposition to changes the Board was considering to the Town’s Zoning Code with respect to wineries. The proposed changes would have modified §280-13A(4) and §280-13C(10) of the Town Zoning Code. After a five-hour public hearing, the Town Board unanimously withdrew the proposal.

Opponents of the proposal used social media to get the word out about the public hearing, and Town Hall was packed with these folks on the hearing date. Perhaps the Town Board should have taken a cue from that and used social media, including the Town’s website, to explain in advance why they were proposing these changes, who would be affected, and encouraging residents who supported the proposal to attend the public hearing.

The proposed changes were aimed at five zoning districts; namely the Agricultural-Conservation District, Residential Low-Density District R-80, Residential Low-Density District R-120, Residential Low-Density District R-200, and Residential Low-Density District R-400. These proposed changes were not applicable to other zoning districts where wineries are also permitted, such as the Limited Business District.

The existing provisions of §280-13A set forth the permitted uses in these five zoning districts. Subsection 4 applies to wineries and lists the standards applicable to that use in these districts. These include: (a) the winery must “be a place or premises on which wine made from primarily Long Island grapes is produced and sold;” (b) the winery must “be on a parcel on which at least 10 acres are devoted to vineyard or other agricultural purposes, and which is owned by the winery owner;” (c) the winery structures are required to “be set back a minimum of 100 feet from a major road;” and (d) the winery needs to have site plan approval.

The proposed changes to §280-13A would have required: (a) that the wine be “produced, processed and sold” at the winery, which wine had to be made from grapes “of which at least 80% are grown on the premises or other land owned by the winery owner;” (b) the winery must be on a parcel where a minimum of “10 acres are devoted to the growing of wine grapes” and which is owned by the winery owner;” and (c) the 10 acres devoted to growing grapes are in addition to land on which structures are located. No changes to the set back and site plan approval provisions were proposed.

The existing provisions of §280-13C set forth the accessory uses. Subsection 10 applies to wineries. That subsection states that a winery “may have an accessory gift shop on the premises which may sell items accessory to wine, such as corkscrews, wine glasses, decanters, items for the storage and display of wine, books on winemaking and the region and nonspecific items bearing the insignia of the winery.” The subsection also states that a winery “may not have a commercial kitchen as an accessory use but may have a noncommercial kitchen facility for private use by the employees.”

The proposed changes to §280-13C(10) changed the “accessory gift shop” to a “retail gift shop” with the same limitation on the type of merchandise that could be offered. In addition, the proposed changes required that the wine be made on the parcel and permitted 20% of the wine sold at a winery to be from other Long Island wineries. No change was made to the kitchen limitations.

The packed house of opponents described the proposal as “anti-farming” or “overly restrictive.” Farmers who grow grapes for sale to wineries they do not own claimed that the proposal would put them out of business. Some opponents stated that the proposal would be the death-knell to new wineries, which would be unable to make any money while their vines matured over several growing seasons. Others were concerned that natural disasters could wipe out a portion of their crops, and that if they bought grapes elsewhere to replace their damaged crops, they would be in violation of the proposed changes.

The Town Supervisor indicated that the Town Board would go back to the drawing board and reconsider the proposal. Whether the Town Board can come up with a proposal that will not be met with similar opposition is uncertain.

On December 12, 2017, the New York State Court of Appeals issued a joint decision on the appeal of two Article 78 proceedings challenging the same proposed development. The two appeals, Friends of P.S. 163 v Jewish Home Lifecare and New York State Department of Health and Wright v New York State Department of Health, sought to annul a decision of the New York State Department of Health (NYSDOH), approving the construction of a 414-bed residential facility for elderly and disabled individuals on the Upper West Side of Manhattan.  The NYSDOH was designated as the lead agency under the State Environmental Quality Review Act (“SEQRA”).   One set of petitioners were the parents of children attending a public elementary school located next door to the facility’s proposed location. The other set of petitioners were tenants living in apartment buildings that surround the facility’s proposed location.

Petitioners complained that the NYSDOH’s SEQRA review was procedurally and substantively flawed and did not adequately address the risks of exposure to hazardous materials, in particular, lead-contaminated soil and airborne lead, as well as exposure to construction noise. In affirming the Appellate Division, which had reversed the decision of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals dismissed both challenges and upheld the NYSDOH’s decision.

The Court of Appeals went through an extensive analysis of what the NYSDOH did prior to issuing its SEQRA Findings Statement. This included: (1) a Phase I environmental site assessment that did not identify any recognized environmental conditions; (2) a Phase II environmental site assessment that included 38 soil samples taken from areas within the footprint of the proposed facility and nearby locations outside the footprint and also included groundwater samples; (3) scoping for the draft environmental impact statement (DEIS); (4) preparation of the DEIS; (5) two public hearings on the DEIS; (6) preparation and filing of the final environmental impact statement (FEIS); and (7) preparation and adoption of the SEQRA Findings Statement.

The Court of Appeals noted that the sampling detected levels of lead in the soil that were typical of sites containing urban fill and were below the restricted residential soil cleanup objectives used by the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation. In addition, the NYSDOH determined that certain mitigative measures would be required to handle, monitor and contain the lead-contaminated soil during construction. As to potential levels of airborne lead dust, the NYSDOH determined that using certain monitoring and mitigation measures during construction would ensure that concentrations of airborne lead dust would not exceed the national ambient air quality standards. As to noise, the NYSDOH conducted modeling to assess potential impacts and assess abatement techniques to control noise. It also relied upon New York City’s Environmental Quality Review Technical Manual to minimize the exceedance of certain decibel limits during construction.

Some of the mitigation measures imposed by the NYSDOH in its SEQRA Findings Statement for the lead-contaminated soil included: (1) extensive construction health and safety plans; (2) a remedial action plan; (3) requiring tarps on trucks; (4) requiring wetting soil during excavation and loading onto the trucks; (5) requiring proper off-site disposal of the soil; (6) vehicle inspections; (7) real-time monitoring of dust levels; and (8) requiring soil vapor barriers for the cellar and sidewalls of the new facility.  The noise-related impacts would be controlled by: (1) ten-foot sound barriers, which would be increased to sixteen feet for classrooms closest to the construction; (2) interior acoustic windows in classrooms facing the construction site; (3) window air conditioning units for certain classrooms; and (4) prohibiting noisy construction activities during the school’s annual testing periods.

In their Article 78 proceedings, petitioners contended that the NYSDOH used flawed assessment methodologies, relied upon outdated standards, failed to adequately mitigate environmental damage of the proposed construction, and failed to adequately consider alternative mitigation measures. In particular, petitioners asserted that the developer should have been required to install central air conditioning in the school and tent the excavation.

Petitioners initially prevailed, getting the Supreme Court to annul and vacate the NYSDOH approval. That was a short-lived victory, as the Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the two proceedings, finding that the trial court has inappropriately substituted its judgment for the expertize of the NYSDOH. The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal and the Court of Appeals affirmed the appellate court.

The Court of Appeals noted that the court’s role in reviewing the lead agency’s decision under SEQRA is limited to determining whether the decision was made in accordance with lawful procedure, and whether substantively the decision was affected by an error of law, was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion. The Court of Appeals further noted that a reviewing court is not supposed to weigh the desirability of the action or choose among the alternatives.   Rather, it is limited to determining whether the agency took a “hard look” at relevant areas of environmental concern and made a “reasoned elaboration” for the grounds of its decision. Using those standards, the Court of Appeals found that the NYSDOH had relied upon the appropriate standards, had carefully considered the potential environmental harm and acted within its authority in choosing among the alternatives, further noting the wide latitude given to agencies in conducting SEQRA reviews.

Thirteen federal agencies released a report in November 2017 in which they conclude that humans are the primary cause of climate change. The report, entitled Climate Science Special Report, is of particular concern to Long Islanders, many of whom live by, work near, or enjoy the coast. Another report, issued at the end of November 2017 by the Regional Plan Association (RPA) entitled Fourth Regional Plan – Making the Region Work For All of Us, also addresses climate change and provides a path for the tri-states to collectively address the impacts of climate change.

According to the RPA, there are 167 local governments and over 3,700 miles of tidal coastline in the tri-state region. The RPA suggests that the region’s response to climate change is hampered by four limiting impediments. First, the RPA notes that there is no plan or budget for regional coastal adaptation projects. Second, the RPA notes that most of the region’s local governments lack the staff and resources to address climate change. Third, the RPA notes that although coastal flooding is a regional problem, planning does not occur on a regional level. Rather, it is done on a local basis, resulting in a hodgepodge of conflicting rules, policies and guidelines. Fourth, the RPA notes that the three states have inconsistent coastal zone management programs.

In New York, the New York State Department of State (NYSDOS) administers New York’s coastal zone management program. According to the RPA, New Jersey’s coastal zone management program primarily relies on federal funding. The RPA notes that Connecticut’s coastal zone management program primarily involves the issuance and approval of permits. While these programs are all different, according to the RPA, they share one similar trait. They each have limited power to regulate land use.

The RPA notes that the New York and Connecticut coastal zone management programs address only certain aspects of climate change. For example, the NYSDOS and the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation developed model local laws that consider risk from sea level rise, storm surge, and flooding and developed guidance on how coastal areas can use natural resources and processes to deal with those problems. Connecticut requires that planners and developers consider the potential impact of sea level rise, coastal flooding, and erosion patterns on coastal development.

The RPA recommends that New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut create a “regional coastal commission” as a way to address climate change on a regional basis. The RPA envisions the function of this regional coastal commission as follows: (1) producing a regional coastal adaptation plan that is not limited by state or local boundaries; (2) developing science-based standards for coastal development; and (3) coordinating collaborative cross-border projects. The RPA suggests that this can be accomplished through adaptation trust funds that are initially funded by surcharges on insurance policy premiums.

The RPA recommends several “best practices” for the regional coastal commission, primarily to keep it free from political influence. These best practices include structuring the commission according to specialization and subject areas. The RPA also suggests using a “neutral facilitator” to help members work through their differences. The RPA also suggests that the commission have an independent advisory science committee and a central data repository. The RPA further suggests that the trust funds be invested in a “diversified funding portfolio” as a means to becoming financially sustaining, rather than relying upon government funding.

The RPA notes there are role models for successful regional commissions, including the San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission, the Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority, the Bay Area Regional Collaborative, the Interstate Environmental Commission in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut, and the multi-state Chesapeake Bay Program.

It remains to be seen whether these three states will agree to establish a regional coastal commission, which would require them to cede certain powers to this commission for the purpose of adapting their coastlines for climate change.

A recent decision by the Appellate Division decided that a village zoning code was inapplicable to a water district. As a result, the water district was able to proceed with replacement of one of its massive elevated water storage tanks and the village was powerless to use its zoning powers to either stop the construction or impose restrictions on the structure.

The case, Incorporated Village of Munsey Park v Manhasset-Lakeville Water District, 57 NY3d 154 [2d Dep’t 2017], involved a special district located within the Town of North Hempstead. The special district, the Manhasset-Lakeville Water District, supplies potable water to consumers located within the district’s boundaries. The water district uses its elevated water storage tanks to store water and maintain water pressure. One of the district’s storage tanks is on property owned by the water district that is located within the boundaries of the Village of Munsey Park (“Village”).

The elevated water storage tank in question was built in 1929. The water district determined it was in need of replacement in 2014. The water district developed a plan to replace the 1929 storage tank and held two public hearings about its proposal. Village officials participated in these public hearings. The district revised the plan after the public hearings, partly to accommodate concerns of the Village and Village residents elicited at the hearings.

The finalized plan called for the replacement of the 1929 storage tank with a new tank that would hold 250,000 gallons more than the 1929 tank. In addition, an antennae was proposed to be installed on the new tank to facilitate wireless communication between the district facilities, its employees, and volunteer firemen. The water district determined that the proposed construction plan was immune from the Village zoning code, based upon the principles enumerated in Matter of County of Monroe (City of Rochester), 533 NY 2d 702 [1988].

The Village sued. It sought a declaratory judgment and permanent injunction to prevent the demolition of the 1929 tank and construction of the replacement tank, claiming that the 30 foot height restriction contained in the Village zoning code would be violated by this structure. The trial court ruled in favor of the water district, a finding that was affirmed by the Second Department.

The appellate court discussed the City of Monroe case, in which the Court of Appeals dealt with the applicability of a local zoning code where two governmental entities are in conflict over a proposed project. The Court of Appeals set forth a balancing test in that case to determine if there is immunity from the local zoning code for the other governmental entity. These factors include: (1) the nature and scope of the governmental entity seeking immunity from the local zoning code, (2) the type of zoning restriction involved, (3) the extent of the public interest served by the local zoning code, (4) the effect that the local zoning code would have on the other governmental entity, and (5) the impact on local interests.

Using this balancing test, the Second Department determined that the water district was immune from the Village zoning code. The court further noted that the Village failed to set forth any basis for the Village’s contention that the Village had the exclusive right to evaluate the factors and make this immunity determination.

One other note. The water district  also determined that the project was a Type II action under the State Environmental Quality Review Act (“SEQRA”) and, thus, not subject to review under SEQRA. This finding was upheld by the trial and appellate courts. The Second Department explained that since the project involved the “replacement, rehabilitation or reconstruction of a structure or facility, in kind,” it was a Type II action under 6 NYCRR § 617.5[c][2], even though it was going to hold 250,000 more gallons than the 1929 tank.

Because of the essential service at issue in this case, the provision of a safe and reliable source of potable water, it is understandable why the courts would favor the water district over a height restriction in a local zoning code.  If the project involved something less vital, the result may have been different.

Last month, the Appellate Division, Second Department, issued two interesting opinions concerning parking. One involved a parking variance and the other involved a restrictive covenant.

Here are the details!

No Parking

In Bonefish Grill, LLC v Zoning Board of Appeals of the Village of Rockville Centre, 2017 N.Y. Slip Op. 006643 [2d Dept September 27, 2017], a restaurant leased property at 340 Sunrise Highway. It was going to demolish an existing structure and replace it with a 5,400 square foot restaurant. The Village Zoning Code required 54 off-street parking spaces for the proposed restaurant. It had none.

The same landlord owned the adjoining property, 330 Sunrise Highway. The restaurant tenant proposed a merger of the two lots in order to take advantage of an exception in the Village Zoning Code that essentially allowed a municipal lot to substitute for the off-street parking for “interior restaurants that abut municipal parking fields.” The 330 Sunrise Highway parcel abutted a municipal parking lot, 340 Sunrise Highway did not.

A building permit was issued for the restaurant based on the merger representation. Just as the construction was nearing completion, the Building Department learned the merger of the two parcels never occurred. The Building Department refused to issue a certificate of occupancy until the restaurant obtained a parking variance. The restaurant entered into a license agreement that gave it access to 40 exclusive parking spaces next door from 4 PM to 12:30 AM weekdays. The parking variance was granted by the zoning board but the board imposed restrictions on the restaurant’s operating hours, tying them to the hours in the license agreement. It also required mandatory valet parking. The restaurant was unhappy with these restrictions and sued.

Although the restaurant prevailed at the trial level, it lost at the appellate court, which found that limiting the hours of operations to coincide with its access to the 40 parking spaces was proper. The restriction was aimed at protecting surrounding businesses and the expected increase in traffic congestion and parking problems.


In Fleetwood Chateau Owners Corp., v Fleetwood Garage Corp., 2017 NY Slip Op. 06431 [2d Dept September 13, 2017], the owner of an apartment building sued a commercial parking garage located on an adjoining parcel to enforce a restrictive covenant contained in a 1924 deed. That restrictive covenant prohibited the construction of nonresidential structures including garages unless the garages were for the exclusive use of occupants of any building built on the property.

In 1929, an apartment building was built on one part of the property. In 1931, a private parking garage was built on another part of the property. The entire site was sold at least twice after that. When the entire site was sold in 1988, the deed failed to mention the 1924 restrictive covenant.

The next purchaser subdivided the property. In 1990, the apartment building portion of the property was sold to Fleetwood Chateau Owners Corp. In 1991, the parking garage portion of the property was sold to Fleetwood Garage Corp. which intended to use it as a commercial parking garage.  Neither of these deeds referenced the 1924 restrictive covenant. Neither Fleetwood entity was a party to the 1924 deed nor mentioned in it as a beneficiary.

The Court noted that restrictive covenants, which place restraints on servient properties in favor of dominant parcels, are strictly construed against parties seeking to enforce them as they encumber the use of real property. The Court further noted that since it was not a party to the 1924 deed and was not mentioned in the deed as a beneficiary, Fleetwood Chateau Owners Corp. had to demonstrate the existence of a common plan or scheme of building development in order to enforce the restrictive covenant.

The Court found that there was no common development plan created for the owners of the subdivided lots.   The Court found no evidence that in 1924, when the land was sold as one parcel, that there was any obligation to subdivide the site. As a result, the Court found that “the covenant cannot be said to have benefitted any part of the land burdened by it.” The Court reasoned that the common grantor to the Fleetwood entities had owned the entire site and was free to do whatever it chose with the property except as against the 1924 grantee who had placed the restriction in the 1924 deed or those that “stood in his shoes.” As the Fleetwood entities solely derived their interest from the 1990/1991 grantee, and their deeds did not contain any restrictive covenant, “the original covenant is not enforceable as between” them. As a result, Fleetwood Chateau Owners Corp. had no standing to enforce the covenant and the parking garage was able to continue operating.

My partner, Anthony Guardino, recently posted a three-part series about land use fees on this blog. This post concerns a decision by the Appellate Division upholding a $776,307 “Park Fee” imposed by the Village of Westhampton Beach in connection with the development of a 6.59 acre tract of land.

Westhampton Beach Associates, LLC v Incorporated Village of Westhampton Beach, 151 AD3d 793 [2d Dept 2017] involves a 39-unit condominium development. The Village Planning Board approved the site plan in 2008 on the condition that the developer pay a recreation or park fee (“Park Fee”) to be set by the Village Board of Trustees pursuant to Village Law § 7-725-a(6) and § 197-63(Q)(2) of the Village Code. The Park Fee was imposed because the reserved area required by the Village Code could not be located within the site plan. The Village determined that 63,684 square feet of reserved area was otherwise required based on the site plan.

The Village Code contains a formula to calculate the Park Fee based on the fair market value of the land at the time of the application, the total area shown on the site plan in square feet, 2,178 square feet of reserved area per dwelling unit and the number of dwelling units.   Using the formula, in 2011, the Village calculated the Park Fee to be $776,307.

The developer sold the parcel to a third-party in 2012 before the developer paid the Park Fee. The deal included a provision that the purchase price was reduced by the amount of the Park Fee that the purchaser would pay to the Village. It also provided that if any portion of the Park Fee was waived by the Village or was disallowed for any reason, the buyer would pay that amount to the developer. Two years later, the developer sued the Village, contending that the Park Fee was unconstitutionally vague, as a way to recoup that money from the purchaser.

The Appellate Division first discussed two defenses raised by the Village – standing and statute of limitations. The Court ruled in favor of the developer on these impediments. The Court held that even though the developer sold the parcel before it paid the Park Fee, it still had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Park Fee. The Court reasoned that the Park Fee was applied to the parcel at the time the developer owned the site and the subsequent sale and price reduction was an actual harm to the developer.   The Court then determined that the claim was not time-barred, as it was not subject to the four-mouth statute of limitations for Article 78 proceedings, since that type of proceeding could not be used to challenge the constitutionality of a Village code provision. Rather, it was governed by the six-year statute of limitations.

Unfortunately for the developer, the Court then ruled against the developer on the merits, finding that the Village Code provision was not constitutionally vague. Thus, the developer is unable to recoup the amount of the reduction in the purchase price attributable to the Park Fee, and the Village is able to continue imposing this significant fee on other applicants.

On July 7, 2017, Judge William G. Ford issued a decision in the case Matter of 7-Eleven, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, Supreme Court, Suffolk County, 2017 NY Slip Op 31467(U) , in which the Town was excoriated for its mishandling of a site plan approval and building permit application. Although the applicant prevailed in court, it took five years to get there, during which the site remained vacant and unproductive. Here’s how it unfolded.

The Facts

In July 2012, 7-Eleven applied for a building permit and certificate of occupancy for a site in Wyandanch. The property contained a defunct automobile repair shop, garage and canopies for an abandoned gasoline service station. 7-Eleven proposed to tear down this eyesore and improve it with a 24-hour 7-Eleven store, a use it contended was as-of-right. The Town, however, had other ideas. The Town’s Building Division initially provided comments in July 2012, which were followed by comments from other Town divisions, including traffic safety, engineering, the fire marshal, environmental control, highways and planning that were issued from July to October 2012.

The Town’s Traffic Division issued comments in October 2012 in which it objected to the project on the grounds that there was insufficient on-site customer truck parking, an inadequate truck loading zone, and inadequate setbacks for trash enclosure and mechanical equipment, which it claimed were too close to residential dwellings. It also raised concerns about an existing 7-Eleven, located within ½ mile of the project. It had issues about ingress and egress that it believed would cause increased traffic and parking on nearby residential streets.

7-Eleven responded to these various comments in February 2013, when it submitted architectural drawings and a revised site plan as well as comments prepared by its expert engineering consultant. This submittal addressed the issues raised by the Town Traffic Division. 7-Eleven included three customer truck parking spaces and a dedicated delivery truck loading zone. 7-Eleven proposed to limit all deliveries to box trucks and modified the trash enclosure and loading zone to decrease noise and lessen visual impacts.

The Town responded with further comments which were provided to 7-Eleven in December 2013.   In particular, the Town’s Traffic Division objected to the revised site plan.

The Town Planning Board then held a public hearing at which further revisions to the site plan were requested. These revisions concerned traffic flow and several covenants and restrictions that would (1) prohibit tractor trailer truck deliveries, (2) limit delivery hours, (3) prohibit truck parking on residential streets, (4) limit hours of operation, and (5) require a security protocol. 7-Eleven agreed to all the covenants and restrictions except it would not agree to limit the hours of operation. The public hearing was left open for the receipt of a traffic study. That study determined that vehicle traffic would be relegated to the major thoroughfare (Straight Path) and would not have a major impact on pedestrian or bus stop safety.

The general public also weighed in on the proposal, via written comments, petitions and letters, objecting to the project.  These opponents were concerned with increased traffic and crime and decreased residential property values and public safety. The operator of the other 7-Eleven, located ½ mile away, also submitted comments, which the court noted “would later loom large” in the Town’s subsequent handling of the application. This operator contended that siting the store so close to his existing store would oversaturate the market and lead to increased competition. He also noted that his donation of surplus food to local charities would decrease and also questioned enforcement of the tractor trailer prohibition.

Although 7-Eleven objected, the public record was held open. During this extended comment period, the Town’s Traffic Division raised concerns about truck parking and traffic. It announced in February 2014 that it would not take any further action to review the application unless and until 7-Eleven undertook further site plan revisions to address its concerns.

In response, 7-Eleven made additional revisions to its site plan. These were shared with the Traffic Division in April 2014 and formally filed with the Town in May 2014. Among other things, 7-Eleven confirmed its commitment to limit deliveries to box trucks, and modified its customer parking and loading zone. It also closed off access from certain streets and proposed to install fencing that would reduce vehicle headlights shining into residential areas. It relocated the trash enclosure and mechanical equipment further away from residential neighbors and eliminated a pedestrian walkway near a residential street.

In July 2014, the Town Traffic Division issued another memo, this time finding fault with the dedicated customer truck parking stall.

7-Eleven filed its final site plan in May 2015.   It also filed engineered drawings,traffic and planning studies, and an appraisal, all dated in April 2015. 7-Eleven also filed an affidavit from its senior regional director and requested that the hearing be finally closed. The affidavit rebutted the comments of the operator of the other 7-Eleven.   It also submitted an affidavit from its engineer in which it contended that its proposed use was superior to seven other similarly-situated commercial uses approved by the Town in the preceding two years.

In September 2015, the Planning Board held a meeting and adjourned the applications. Thereafter, in February 2016, additional comments were issued by the Town’s Traffic Division in which it noted its agreement with the operator of the other 7-Eleven and rejected the opinion of 7-Eleven’s regional director about truck traffic, parking and impacts on the adjacent residential neighborhood. But that was not the end of the Town’s Traffic Division’s comments. Two months later, in April 2016, the Town’s Traffic Division issued a memo to the effect that the proposed covenants and restrictions were insufficient. As a result, the Town requested that 7-Eleven submit yet another revised site plan.

At this point, 7-Eleven had had it; and in June 2016, it sent a demand letter to the Town calling for an up or down determination on its application. In August 2016, the Planning Board denied the application. The rationale given for the denial was the safety of the residential neighborhoods that abutted the site on two sides, the adverse impact on traffic and parking, and public safety concerns.

Not surprisingly, 7-Eleven sued.

The Lawsuit

The Town claimed its decision should be upheld by the Court on the grounds it was rational and based on substantial evidence. The Town also contended its decision was not final, contending that 7-Eleven’s lawsuit was not ripe because it failed to apply to the Zoning Board of Appeals for variance relief. The Court didn’t buy these arguments.

The Court first discussed the ripeness issue. It noted that a land use and zoning matter is final when the “development plan has been submitted, considered and rejected by the governmental entity with the power to implement zoning regulations” but that an applicant “will be excused from obtaining a final decision if pursuing an appeal to a zoning board of appeals or seeking a variance would be futile.” Thus, resort to a zoning board of appeals is unnecessary if it “lacks discretion to grant variances or dug in its heels and made clear that all such applications will be denied.” The Court noted that 7-Eleven sought site plan review and a building permit to demolish existing structures and to construct a new building. Neither was granted by the Town, essentially stymying the project. Moreover, since the application was as-of-right, and the setbacks the Town claimed were applicable did not apply to this corner lot, there is no variance that it needed from the Town Zoning Board of Appeals.

The Court then took aim at the Town’s discretion argument. In rejecting it, the Court noted that the Town gave into public pressure about traffic, crime and property values plummeting. The Court found that the Town improperly ignored the concessions made by 7-Eleven to ameliorate the supposed impacts. It also focused on the multiple revisions and the lack of evidence in the record supporting the Town’s decision.


7-Eleven has the financial wherewithal to see a project through, despite the years it takes to get it approved on Long Island. Other applicants may not have the ability to withstand such an extended and expensive proposition to open a business, redevelop a blighted site and revitalize a neighborhood.

According to the American Planning Association, a “floating zone” is a zoning district that “delineates conditions” rather than the more traditional use classifications that are typically found on zoning maps. While a floating zone is contained in a zoning code, it is only added to the zoning map after a project seeking that designation is approved. Thus, it “floats” in the zoning code until it is used for a particular project.


Lindenhurst’s Downtown Redevelopment District Floating Zone

The Village of Lindenhurst Board of Trustees approved a new local law at its June 6, 2017 meeting that creates a Downtown Redevelopment District Floating Zone. The purpose of this Floating Zone is to use Smart Growth principles to encourage development of the downtown area. The Village Trustees believe this new zone will foster mixed-use redevelopment, including pleasant and attractive residential developments within walking distance of the Lindenhurst Long Island Rail Road station and the central business district.

The Process

The local law contains a two-step process for changing a site to the Floating Zone designation. First, a conceptual development plan and reclassification of specific parcels will need to be approved by the Board of Trustees. The second step will entail an approval of a detailed site development plan, and subdivision plat, if applicable, by the Board of Trustees.

The change of zone application to a Floating Zone needs to include a statement describing the nature of the project and how it advances the purpose of the Floating Zone. It also needs to describe adjoining and surrounding properties, the availability of community facilities and utilities, and anticipated traffic generation. The applicant also has to discuss open spaces proposed for the development.

The conceptual development plan needs to be drawn to scale and indicate the approximate location and conceptual design of all buildings, parking areas and access drives. It also needs to show the neighboring streets and properties and include the names of the owners of property located within 200 feet of the site. A traffic study can be requested by the Board of Trustees.

The local law provides that if the Board of Trustees entertains an application to change zoning to the Floating Zone, it will hold a public hearing. The local law also provides that if the Board of Trustees decides not to entertain such an application, it can do so with or without a public hearing and with or without SEQRA review.

The Criteria 

The local law provides criteria for the Board of Trustees to consider for Floating Zone applications. These include: (1) the location of the proposed development and its proximity to the railroad station and central business district; (2) minimum site size, dimensions and topography; (3) ownership of the parcels; (4) permitted uses; (5) height of structures, which is limited to 53 feet; (6) maximum density, which is limited to 37 units per acre; (7) maximum occupancy for residential units, which is set at two for studio units and the number of bedrooms plus two for all other units; (8) minimum floor area of any residential unit, which is set at 580 square feet; (9) minimum building setbacks, which are set at  ten feet for front and rear yards, side yard setbacks are ten feet for one side yard and twenty feet total for side yards; (10) parking minimums for retail and office use is one space per 250 square feet; multi-family residential use is based on the types of units – studios require 1.15 parking spots per unit, one-bedroom units require 1.30 spots per unit, two-bedroom units require 1.75 spots per unit and three or more bedroom units require 2.0 spots per unit; (11) basements and cellars are not allowed to be used for living, sleeping or habitable space; and (12) each building must have security and fire alarms.

It will be interesting to see if this new zoning classification helps Lindenhurst revitalize its downtown.


The Town of Babylon’s plan to revitalize the Route 110 corridor in East Farmingdale, NY keeps moving forward. The Town began targeting this area for transformation in 2005. It now looks like the Town may be closer than ever to achieving its goal of redeveloping 100 acres surrounding the intersection of Route 110 and Conklin Street.redevelopment shutterstock_601952789

The targeted area poses challenges to redevelopment. There are height constraints and a runway protection zone associated with Republic Airport. The Route 110-Conklin Street intersection is user unfriendly and unsafe. The automobile-oriented nature of the area, including large parking lots, limited sidewalks, and widely disbursed buildings, is not conducive to pedestrian and bicycle users. In addition, past industrial uses may have left a legacy of contamination.

East Farmingdale Design Charrette

Residents, business owners and other interested parties participated in a multi-day meeting in January and February 2017 with a design team hired by the Town to flesh out ideas and concepts of what the community wants to see in this redevelopment effort. In April 2017, the results of this meeting, referred to as a design charrette, were presented by the design team in a report entitled East Farmingdale Design Charrette.

The lynchpin of the design hinges on re-opening and upgrading the East Farmingdale Long Island Rail Road station, which has been shuttered for almost 30 years. The MTA earmarked $5 million from its capital budget toward this effort. This closed station is adjacent to properties that were part of Republic Airport and are currently owned by the state. The plan calls for these parcels to be the core of a transit-oriented development location. The plan also includes a bus rapid transit  stop that Suffolk County is planning for the Route 110-Conklin Street intersection.

Redevelopment Wish List

The charrette participants came up with a wish list of big ideas. These include walkways, pedestrian crossings, bicycle lanes, and mixed use retail and residential with pocket parks. The residential components would include single family homes, apartments and affordable housing. Other ideas coming out of the charrette were a museum, transit hub, and green space. The design team commented on the desire of many participants for a village-like feel, rather than an urban city vibe, for the redevelopment. The design team also noted that community gathering spaces and cultural facilities are currently missing from the targeted area and should be included in the redevelopment.

The design team drafted a Form-Based Code that will help guide future development. The code, while still a first draft, provides physical details such as height restrictions, distances between buildings, landscape specifications and open space requirements.

Check out the Town of Babylon’s website for more information about this project.