Article 78

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In 2015 the Village of East Hampton enacted five local laws reducing the maximum allowable gross floor area for residences, reducing the maximum permitted coverage for all structures,  reducing the maximum allowable gross floor area for accessory buildings, amending the definition of “story” and amending the definition of “cellar”. The petitioner/plaintiffs (“petitioners”) own real property in the Village and commenced a hybrid Article 78 proceeding and Declaratory Judgment action entitled Bonacker Property, LLC v. Village of East Hampton Board of Trustees et al., Supreme Court, Suffolk County, Index No. 15-12506, September 2, 2016, challenging the enactment of the local laws. Petitioners sought to annul the Board of Trustee’s adoption of a negative declaration under the State Environmental Quality Review Act (“SEQRA”) and claimed that (i) the local laws were not in accordance with the Village Comprehensive Plan, (ii) the Board of Trustees improperly relied upon recommendations from the Planning and Zoning Committee, and (iii) the Board of Trustees failed to comply with SEQRA. The petition also sought declaratory relief. The Supreme Court denied the petition, dismissed the proceeding/action and declared the local laws constitutional and valid. The petitioners appealed.

The Appellate Division, Second Department upheld the Supreme Court’s determination in Matter of Bonacker Property, LLC et al, v. Village of East Hampton Board of Trustees, et al., dated January 23, 2019. The Court noted that New York State Village Law §7-722(11)(a) requires that where a village has adopted a comprehensive plan, the village’s zoning decisions must be in accordance with the plan. However, the Court went on to recognize the presumption of validity afforded to the legislative act of enacting zoning laws. The Court quoted Matter of Town of Bedford v. Village of Mount Kisco, 33 N.Y.2d 178, 186, stating “[e]ven if the validity of a provision is fairly debatable, the municipality’s judgment as to its necessity must control.”   Ultimately, the Court found the enactments limiting gross floor area and coverage “entirely consistent with the comprehensive plan.”

The Court also found that the Village Board of Trustees complied with the requirements of SEQRA stating the Board identified the relevant areas of environmental concern, took the requisite “hard look” at them and made a reasoned elaboration in its negative declaration. The Court stated, “[g]iven the nature of the proposed action here, which would have only beneficial environmental effect, and the focus of the assessment form, which is to identify negative environmental effects of the proposed action, the rapid review and completion of the environmental assessment form was not arbitrary or capricious.”

Moreover, the Court found that the record supported the Supreme Court’s determination that the Planning and Zoning Committee was advisory in nature, did not perform governmental functions and it was proper for the Board of Trustees to rely on the committee’s advice pertaining to the enactment of the local laws.

Ultimately, the Court upheld the Supreme Court’s determination with regard to the Article 78 claims however remanded the declaratory judgment claims back to the Supreme Court since the Supreme Court improperly employed the summary procedure applicable to an Article 78 proceeding to dispose causes of action to recover damages or seeking declaratory judgment. The Court noted, “where no party makes a request for a summary determination of the causes of action which seek to recover damages or declaratory relief, it is error for the Supreme Court to summarily dispose of those causes of action.” Thus, the Court remitted the matter back to the Supreme court for further proceedings on those causes of action for damages and declaratory judgment. Finally, the Court expressed no opinion as to the merits of those claims.

In Abbatiello v Town of North Hempstead, 164 A.D.3d 785 [2d Dept. 2018], the Second Department recently reversed Supreme Court, Nassau County and granted the petitioner’s CPLR Article 78 challenge to the Town of North Hempstead Board of Zoning Appeals (“Board”) denial of a use variance.  In finding that the house was a “legal nonconforming” 2-family residence, the Appellate Division ordered the Town to issue the requested  use variance.

A legal nonconforming use, commonly referred to as “grandfathered”, is a use of property which lawfully existed prior to the enactment of a zoning ordinance which now prohibits it.  The “legal nonconforming” use doctrine is a fact sensitive inquiry that protects property rights, which is directly at odds with a municipality’s comprehensive plan for an area.

The courts are routinely the venue used to protect legal nonconforming uses property rights.   In Abbatiello, when the petitioner purchased the property in 1977, he believed that the house was a legal two-family residence.  Since he purchased the property, the petitioner has been renting out the two units, and he has obtained various permits from the Town allowing him to do so.  In October 2013, the petitioner applied for a variance to permit him to continue using the property as a two-family dwelling.  The Town rejected the application, and the petitioner appealed to the Board, which ultimately denied the petitioner.  The Supreme Court affirmed the Board’s denial.

In reversing the Supreme Court, the Appellate Division found that the property owner was entitled to the use variance permitting him to use the property as two-family dwelling for rental purposes.  The owner presented evidence, including affidavits from neighbors and others who had lived in community for many years, which was sufficient to establish that property was legal two-family residence prior to amendments to the town zoning code, and there was no evidence presented to demonstrated that property had been converted into two-family dwelling after amendments.  As the Court noted, critical to establishing a legal nonconforming use, a property owner must demonstrate that the allegedly preexisting use was legal prior to the enactment of the zoning ordinance that purportedly rendered it nonconforming.  Id.

If you are facing zoning challenges to a use that is “grandfathered” you may be able to use the “legal nonconforming” doctrine to protect your property right(s).

In Matter of HV Donuts, LLC v. Town of LaGrange Zoning Board of Appeals, the Second Department recently held that a property owner’s nonconforming use rights continue despite a temporary business interruption caused by a fuel truck accident and gasoline spill.

The property owner, Leemilt’s Petroleum, Inc. (the “Owner”), leased the subject property (the “Premises”) to a tenant who operated a gas station and a convenience store at the Premises. Both the gas station and the convenience store were legal nonconforming uses under the Town’s zoning regulations.

Under Section 240-29 of the Code of the Town of LaGrange (hereinafter the “Code”), a “nonconforming use . . . is one which existed lawfully” prior to the date that the Code or an amendment to the Code was enacted, which results in the failure of that prior use to conform to the Code (see Code § 240-29[B]). However, in order for such use to maintain its status as a nonconforming use, it must not be discontinued. The Code provides that a nonconforming use is deemed discontinued when “the nonconformity has ceased for a period of one year or more” (see Code § 240-29[F][4]).

The case arose out of an accident in June 2013, when a fuel delivery tanker hit a light pole, spilling approximately 3,000 gallons of gasoline on the Premises. This forced the gas station and the convenience store to temporarily cease business operations and begin remedial efforts. After the Owner completed the restoration work in October 2014, a leak was discovered in the gasoline pump system piping when it was tested in anticipation of reopening. This required additional remediation and further delayed the reopening.

Eventually, the Owner completed this additional work and thereafter sought approval from the Town’s building inspector to reopen the gas station. The Owner also applied for a building permit from the Town’s building inspector “to upgrade the convenience store building, which had not been damaged by the spill and remediation efforts.” Section 240-29(E) of the Code permits the “re-establishment of nonconforming uses after casualties,” under certain time conditions. Section 240-29(E) of the Code provides the following:

“If any nonconforming building or structure or any building or structure containing a nonconforming use shall be damaged or destroyed by fire or other casualty, such building or structure . . . may be restored and any such nonconforming use resumed to the extent that such building, structure or use existed at the time of the casualty, provided that a building permit for such restoration is obtained within a period of one year from such casualty and is diligently prosecuted to completion.”

Pursuant to that provision, the building inspector granted the Owner’s request, giving it one year from September 22, 2015—the date of the building inspector’s determination—to re-establish its nonconforming use.

A Dunkin Donuts franchise (the “Petitioner”) located across the street from the Premises appealed the building inspector’s determination to the Town’s Zoning Board of Appeals (the “ZBA”). The Petitioner contended that the nonconforming use had been lost and could not be re-established, citing Sections 240-29(E) and (F) of the Code.

The ZBA determined that “there was ‘more to maintaining a gasoline filling station than pumping gas,’” and that the “remediation of the petroleum spills amounted to a continuation of the nonconforming use.” Thus, there was no “discontinuation” within the meaning of Code Section 240-29(F)(4). Furthermore, the ZBA concluded that the building permit requirement of Code Section 240-29(E) did not apply to the convenience store because neither casualty affected the convenience store.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court rejected the Petitioner’s Article 78 challenge, holding that the ZBA’s determinations were rationally based and entitled to deference. The Second Department affirmed. Therefore, under HV Donuts, a nonconforming use may not be lost by remedial and restoration activities that temporarily shut down site operations, provided these activities are diligently pursued and completed.

In Peyton v. New York City Bd. of Standards and Appeals, (2018 N.Y. 06870, 166 A.D.3d 120 (1st Dept 2018), Petitioners-community residents (“Petitioners”) commenced a proceeding to challenge the City of New York (“City”) Board of Standards and Appeals’s (“Board”) resolution upholding the City Department of Buildings’s (“DOB”) decision to grant a permit for the construction of a twenty-story nursing home (“Project”) on the Upper West Side.  The main issue is the City’s “open space” mandate (“Open Space Law”) and whether the Project provides enough open space to suffice the requirement.  The Court rulings and the Project’s viability hinged entirely upon how to calculate compliance with the Open Space Law.

At the outset, it is crucial to note the difference between a building-by-building calculation for open space and an open space calculation in the aggregate.  The former calculates the required open space with respect to each individual building within a zoning lot, whereas the latter considers the open space requirement for all buildings existing on an entire zoning lot together.  This distinction is at the heart of the dispute.

Procedurally, as relevant herein, the DOB made its open space calculation for the Project based upon a “building-by-building” methodology and decided to issue the construction permit.  One or more of the Petitioners appealed the DOB’s decision to the Board.  The Board resolved to uphold the issuance of the permit and the calculation methodology, which resolution the Petitioners challenged in this proceeding.  The Supreme Court, New York County, denied the petition and affirmed the Board’s resolution.  Petitioners appealed and the Appellate Division, First Department, reversed.

The Project site is within a “superblock” zoning lot known as “Park West Village” comprising 308,475 square feet, or 7 acres (“Zoning Lot”) (between 97th and 100th Streets and Columbus and Amsterdam Avenues; the complex extends to Central Park, but that portion is not at issue).  The complex on the Zoning Lot was built in the 1950s and 1960s as part of a federally subsidized middle-income urban renewal project and includes residential buildings, a school, a church, a public library, a health center and commercial buildings.  There are four residential buildings: three original sixteen-story buildings and a more recently constructed twenty-nine-story mixed commercial and residential building (“Fourth Building”).

A forty-year deed restriction had prohibited construction on the Zoning Lot through 2006 and the present owner (“Owner”) acquired the land shortly before the prohibition expired.  Approving and constructing the Fourth Building was the center of controversy between Petitioners, Owner, the City and others, which controversy also revolved around the City’s open space requirements.

Since its inception in 1961, and despite amendments in 1977, the Open Space Law had no particular design or mode to address zoning lots improved with multiple buildings.  With respect to the Fourth Building, there was a disagreement over whether its rooftop open space could count towards the open space requirement for the entire Zoning Lot.  The Fourth Building’s rooftop space included a 42,500 square feet garden, with a mosaic tile saltwater pool, sundeck and lawn.  However, the rooftop garden provided access only to residents of the Fourth Building and did not allow access to occupants of other buildings within the Zoning Lot.  If the Fourth Building’s rooftop garden was included in the open space calculation, then the project met the requirements; if not, then the project would fail.

The DOB performed a building-by-building analysis for the Zoning Lot, included the rooftop garden in its calculation and issued a building permit in 2007.  Residents of Park West Village and others challenged the DOB’s approval based upon the fact that the Fourth Building’s rooftop garden did not provide access to all residents of the Zoning Lot and, thus, could not be included in the open space calculation.

In 2009, the Board resolved to affirm the DOB’s decision (“2009 Resolution”), wherein the Board noted that the Open Space Law’s language requires open space with respect to a “building,” not the zoning lot as a whole; therefore, open space among multiple buildings need not be common, centralized space shared by all occupants of the zoning lot, and the building-by-building methodology for calculating open space suffices.  The 2009 Resolution utilized the building-by-building methodology for the first time and stated: “as each of the buildings is allocated the amount of space that is in excess of that which would be required…if they were located on separate zoning lots, it cannot be seen how those residents would be deprived of an equitable share of open space by the proposed building.”  The Board’s resolution was challenged, but the challenge was settled out of court and the Fourth Building was completed.

Two years later, in February 2011, the City amended the Open Space Law (“2011 Amendments”).  The definition of “open space” has always been: “that part of a zoning lot, including courts or yards, which is open and unobstructed from its lowest level to the sky and is accessible to and usable by all persons occupying a dwelling unit or a rooming unit on the zoning lot.”  The 2011 Amendments modified several other provisions of the Open Space Law (e.g. “open space ratio,” “minimum open space,” etc.) by substituting the words “zoning lot” and “all zoning lots” for the words “building” and “any buildings,” focusing the law and its analysis upon the actual zoning lots – as opposed to individual buildings.

After the City enacted the 2011 Amendments, the Owner sought to utilize a former parking lot within the Zoning Lot, which Park West Village residents previously used.  The Owner entered into an exchange agreement with the Project’s developer (“Developer”) to swap the parking lot for another parcel of land located north of the Zoning Lot and owned by the Developer (“New Parcel”).  The New Parcel was large enough for the Owner to construct another luxury apartment building.  The Owner agreed to pay the Developer $35,000,000 and the Developer promised to complete the project on the former parking lot.  However, this exchange was contingent upon, among other things, the Developer obtaining a permit from the DOB for construction of the Project.

In March 2011, the Developer made its applications to the DOB, which expressly noted that the open space within the Project would be accessible to all persons occupying a dwelling unit on the Zoning Lot.  Developer’s open space calculations for the Project included all of the open space on the zoning lot, including the Fourth Building’s rooftop garden.  Petitioners objected and argued that, based upon the 2011 Amendments to the Open Space Law, the Fourth Building’s rooftop garden no longer counted towards the open space calculation for the Zoning Lot (due to restricted access) and that the building-by-building methodology was invalid.

The DOB disagreed and granted a building permit for the Project.  Petitioners appealed to the Board and the Board resolved to affirm (“2011 Resolution”), relying upon the 2009 Resolution: “in the case of a multi-building zoning lot, the open space definition could be read to allow some open space to be reserved for the residents of a single building as long as the residents of each building on the zoning lot have access to at least the amount of space that would be required…if each building were on separate zoning lots.”  The Board also noted that the 2011 Amendments did not dictate a change in the DOB’s or Board’s building-by-building methodology or open space analysis.

Petitioners challenged the Board’s 2011 Resolution by commencing this proceeding and argued that, even though the Fourth Building’s rooftop garden was arguably within the meaning of open space when it was constructed in 2009, it presently was not open space by virtue of the 2011 Amendments.  These changes to the Open Space Law eliminated any ambiguity as to how to calculate open space and the Fourth Building’s rooftop garden cannot be included because the area is not available to all occupants of the Zoning Lot.

It was undisputed that the Project sufficed the open space requirement with the inclusion of the Fourth Building’s rooftop garden.  It was also undisputed that the Project failed to provide adequate open space without the rooftop garden.  The Board’s main argument was that the City’s Open Space Law is ambiguous and, therefore, the DOB and the Board have discretion to construe it.  In particular, the Board argued that the definition of open space (with accessibility and usability for all residents within a zoning lot) is irreconcilable with the definition of “zoning lot,” which contemplated multiple buildings on a single lot.  Therefore, the Open Space Law was ambiguous and the DOB and the Board were free to interpret and reconcile this ambiguity, i.e. by utilizing the building-by-building methodology.  The Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition and dismissed the proceeding. Petitioners appealed and the Appellate Division reversed and annulled the 2011 Resolution.

On appeal, the Appellate Division disagreed with the Board and adopted the Petitioners’ argument that the 2011 Amendments removed the contextual basis upon which the Board relied.  Judicial deference should be given to an agency’s interpretation of a statute it is charged with implementing, unless the interpretation is unreasonable or irrational.  However, where the question is one of pure statutory interpretation, an agency’s interpretation is accorded much less weight and Courts are free to ascertain the proper interpretation from the statutory language and legislative intent.  Here, resolving the dispute concerning the 2011 Amendments does not implicate the expertise of the DOB or the Board as the implementing administrative agencies; instead, the resolution is one of pure statutory analysis and does not require deference to the agencies.

The Appellate Division held that the definition of “open space” is clear and unambiguous, requiring open space to be accessible to all residents of any residential building on the zoning lot – not only the building containing the open space in question.  The Court noted this clarity is further bolstered by the 2011 Amendments, which eliminated all references to “building” and replaced the term with “zoning lot” in the relevant Open Space Law provisions.  Therefore, any space, including a rooftop, that is to be considered “open space” for purpose of satisfying the requirement must be accessible and usable by all residents of the zoning lot.  In addition, the Court expressly invalidated the building-by-building methodology: “Lest there be any doubt, we find that the 2011 [A]mendments now preclude use of [this] methodology, which has been an exception to this clear statutory import.”

The Court also noted that absence of legislative history did not evidence an intent to accept the building-by-building methodology.  Rather, the 2011 Amendments replacement of the word “building” was an unmistakable rejection of the use of this formula.  Notably, one of the four Judges dissented, which may lead the case to the Court of Appeals.

In 1999, the Greenport Group, LLP (“Greenport Group”) acquired a 31 acre parcel of land located on the east side of Chapel Lane and the north side of the Main Road in Greenport in the Town of Southold. The southerly portion of the property was zoned “Limited Business” and the northerly portion was zoned “Hamlet Density”. When purchased, there were four buildings on the property, each containing two residential units that were part of a larger project to build multi-residence senior citizen housing, which had been approved for an additional 140 units. The Planning Board and Zoning Board of Appeals granted a conditional site plan and special exception approval for the construction of the multiple residence complex in or about 1976, with certificates of occupancy being issued for the four buildings on the property in 1984. The additional units were never built and no further construction took place on site.

On September 12, 2000, the Town Board of the Town of Southold adopted a local law, Local Law 20 of 2000, changing the zoning of the property to Residential Low Density, R-80. The R-80 designation increased the minimum lot size permitted on the property from 10,000 square feet to 80,000 square feet. The local law was filed with the Secretary of State on October 2, 2000. Thereafter, the Greenport Group filed a hybrid Article 78 proceeding and Declaratory Judgment action in Supreme Court on February 2, 2001, entitled Greenport Group, LLP and Adrienne Solof v. The Town Board of the Town of Southold, Index No. 01-2730, seeking a judgment declaring that the local law up-zoning the property was null and void. Greenport Group alleged that the Town Board’s actions were arbitrary and capricious, that the re-zoning subjected their property to disparate treatment and constituted reverse spot zoning, that they had vested rights in the prior zoning designations, that the rezoning was inconsistent with the goals of the Town Comprehensive Plan, and the rezoning constituted a regulatory taking of the property without just compensation. In response, the Town Board moved for summary judgment.

The Supreme Court, Suffolk County, by decision dated June 17, 2015, granted summary judgment in part, dismissing the Greenport Group’s claims that (i) the Town failed to comply with the notice requirements rendering the local law adoption invalid since plaintiff actually participated in the local law hearing, (ii) the Town’s adoption of the local law changing the zoning constituted impermissible spot zoning where Greenport Group failed to allege or offer evidence that the change was “for the benefit of the owner to the detriment of other owners”, (iii) that Greenport Group had vested property rights in the prior zoning of the property when no construction was performed on site in connection with the development prior to the zone change, and (iv) the re-zoning constitutes a taking without just compensation since Greenport Group citing an 80% diminution of the property’s value was deemed insufficient and failed to prove that the property was incapable of producing a reasonable return or that the economic value of the property was destroyed by the zone change.

The Supreme Court denied the Town’s motion for summary judgment relative to the second and fifth causes of action asserted by Greenport Group. The second and fifth causes of action asserted by the Greenport Group alleged that the Town Board’s adoption was arbitrary and capricious representing an unconstitutional abuse of the Town Board’s zoning authority, and that the re-zoning was unjustified and failed to achieve the purported goals of the local law and land use plans. Here, the Court found that Greenport Group had raised triable issues of fact as to whether the Town Board’s stated intent of the re-zoning was the actual purpose for re-zoning Greenport Group’s property. The Supreme Court stated, “[p]arenthetically, since the re-zoning was enacted approximately 14 years ago, the witnesses’ recollection as to the zoning classification was legitimately less than ideal. Although the Town Board’s decision appears to be supported by the CR48 Land Use Study… and tremendous deference is given to the local municipality’s decision-making process and its authority, the Court will not simply rubberstamp a local municipality’s assertion that it was following the advice of its own consultant. Instead, the Court must examine the record, including the adopted legislation, to determine whether the legislation was reasonable and enacted in accordance with the municipality’s land use plan. Here, notwithstanding the documentary evidence supporting the Town Board’s claim, plaintiffs raise questions of fact concerning similarly situated properties included within the CCG studies but treated differently by the Town Board.” Therefore, the Supreme Court denied the Town’s motion for summary judgment with respect to these two causes of action.

The parties cross-appealed the matter and the Appellate Division, Second Department, in its decision entitled Greenport Group, LLC et al., v. Town Board of the Town of Southold, dated December 5, 2018, remitted the matter to the Supreme Court for “severance” of the causes of action asserted by Greenport Group and the entry of judgment declaring the Local Law that changed the zoning classification was valid. The Appellate Division reviewed and affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of each of Greenport Groups causes of action. However, the Court found that the Supreme Court should have granted the Town Board’s motion for summary judgement with respect to the second and fifth causes asserting that the rezoning of the property was arbitrary and inconsistent with the comprehensive plan. The Appellate Division cited the “heavy burden of countering the strong presumption of validity accorded the enactment [of local laws]” and further stated that “if the validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes is even ‘fairly debatable,’ the classification must be sustained upon judicial review (citing, Matter of Town of Bedford v. Village of Mount Kisco, 33 NY2d at 186).” The Appellate Division also found that Greenport Group failed to raise a triable issue of fact, contrary to the Supreme Court’s findings, regarding the purpose and intent of the re-zoning stating, “[w]hile the courts must satisfy themselves that the rezoning meets the statutory requirement that zoning be in accordance with the comprehensive plan of the community, this does not entail examining the motives of local officials (Udell v. Haas, 21 NY2d 463, 471).” Ultimately, the Appellate Division found that the local law changing the zoning classification of the Greenport Group’s property was valid and remitted the matter to the Supreme Court for appropriate judgment.

 

 

In a decision dated October 30, 2018, Supreme Court Judge Joseph Pastoressa remanded a decision made by the Southampton Village Architectural and Historic Board (BARHP) for further consideration. Manger et al. v. Board of Architectural Review and Historic Review of the Village of Southampton.

 The property owner in Manger applied to the BARHP for a certificate of appropriateness to construct a single family dwelling and accessory structures on two separate lots in the Village of Southampton. The lots are in a Historic District which requires a Certificate of Appropriateness as a condition precedent to issuing a building permit.

During the public hearing process that resulted in an approval of the application, the Board stated that it could not consider the size of the house in its review of the proposed construction. The Board took this position because the house as proposed fully complied with the Zoning Code of the Village of Southampton. That position was supported by Board precedent and a prior decision in Ferrara v. Board of Architectural Review.

Immediate neighbors of the property brought the Article 78 proceeding and argued that scale and size were different measurements and the Board could consider the scale of houses and any corresponding impact on the neighboring properties. Alternatively, the property owner and Village argued that if a house complied with Zoning then the BARHP was powerless to require a reduction in size. Ultimately, Judge Pastoressa rejected that argument and sent the matter back to the Board for re-consideration.

This case highlights the tension between the Zoning Code and the Historic and Landmark Preservation Code. Historically, zoning was enacted to protect light and air between properties. This protection is accomplished through setbacks and the restrictions on the size of a structure. One of the stated considerations of the Historic and Landmark Preservation Law is the impact of new construction on the character of nearby properties.

As held by Judge Pastoressa, the BARHP now may consider the impact of new construction on surrounding properties. But, that consideration still must include an analysis of the new construction under Zoning Code provisions.

Since the Declaration of Purposes of the Zoning Code (§116-1) and the Legislative Findings and Intent (§65-1) in the Historic and Landmark Preservation Law share many common core goals, compliance with the Zoning Code is certainly compelling if not overwhelming evidence that the mass and scale of new construction is appropriate.  So, while the option to reduce the size of a structure is seemingly available to the BAHRP, it must show that the Zoning Code somehow failed to achieve one of its basic goals. There must be significant evidence showing an impact not addressed by the Zoning Code for the BARHP to reduce the size of a structure under that which is allowed by Zoning.

Ultimately, this leaves a potential purchaser of real property in a bind. Any advice by counsel to a purchaser must be given with a caveat that the BAHRP has final say and compliance with the Zoning Code does not guarantee approval.

 

Local zoning ordinances throughout New York State incorporate the flexible “accessory use” component so as not to unnecessarily restrict one’s use of property.  Accessory uses are incidental and customary to the principal use of property. Determining whether a use is actually “accessory,” however, is often debated – especially where the use is not specifically enumerated as such or where the ordinance does not define the use.

Recently, in Brophy v. Town of Olive Zoning Board of Appeals, 2018 N.Y. Slip Op. 07388 (3d Dept), the accessory use debate engaged the Appellate Division, Third Department.  Ashokan Dreams, a bed-and-breakfast on 28-acres in the Town of Olive (“Town“), began operating in 1998.  Ashokan Dreams was zoned “residential-rural-3A,” which permitted, among other uses, “tourist homes,” “boardinghouses” and “commercial recreation.”

The proprietors of the bed-and-breakfast first sought and obtained site plan approval, without conditions, from the Town Planning Board (“Planning Board“) for a single guest bedroom bread-and-breakfast operation in 1998.  Almost two-decades later, and without further approvals, Ashokan Dreams had expanded to three guest rooms and offered weddings – upwards of 12 each year – with limited lodging.  In 2015, the Town Zoning Enforcement Officer (“ZEO“) advised Ashokan Dreams in writing that site plan review was required because the weddings had grown to affect the health, safety and welfare of the neighbors and that site plan review would be a proper remedy via the imposition of certain limitations.

Ashokan Dreams submitted a site plan application to the Planning Board, which referred the matter to the ZEO and the Town Zoning Board (“ZBA“).  After a public hearing, the ZBA determined that the weddings were a “permitted special use to a bed-and-breakfast” requiring site plan review and remitted the matter back to the Planning Board.  Notably, the ZBA also reasoned that periodic seasonal events, including weddings, could be an “accessory use” at the site.  Neighboring property owners and a neighborhood association (collectively “Neighbors“) commenced an Article 78 proceeding seeking to annul the ZBA’s determination.  The Supreme Court, Ulster County, partially granted and partially dismissed the Neighbor’s petition, holding: the ZBA correctly determined weddings were an accessory use, but erred by legislating a “new use subject to a special permit requirement.”  The Neighbors appealed challenging, inter alia, the accessory use finding and the Appellate Division affirmed.

The Third Department noted that, generally, a zoning board’s interpretation of local zoning ordinance is afforded deference and will only be disturbed if it is unreasonable or irrational.   This deferential standard was applicable “because [determining] whether a proposed accessory use is incidental and customarily found in connection with the principal use of property is, to a great extent, fact-based.  Resolution of the accessory use question depends upon an analysis of the nature and character of the principal use of the land in question in relation to the accessory use, taking into consideration the over-all character of the particular area in question.”[1]

In its analysis of whether the wedding venue accessory use was customary and incidental to the bed-and-breakfast, the Court considered the character of the use and the area in question.  The district permitted “tourist homes,” “boardinghouses” and “commercial recreation.”  Tourist homes are dwellings which offer up to four rooms for transient guests.  Boardinghouses are dwellings occupied by one family and three or more lodgers.  Each of these uses permit the provision of services of a temporary residence.  Commercial recreation is defined as making use of mountain land, including resort hotels, seasonal commercial camps resort ranches, resort lodges and bungalow colonies.  Notably, another bed-and-breakfast in the same district offered similar weddings services.  The Court found held that the ZBA’s determination was not irrational or unreasonable and its reliance, in part, on the fact that another bed-and-breakfast within the same district also offered wedding services was not in error.

[1] The Town ordinance defined “accessory use” as one that is customarily incidental and subordinate to the principal use of the premises. And, for all residential districts, the Town ordinance authorized any other accessory buildings or use considered by the ZBA to be customarily incidental to any related principal use therein.

The Second Department recently reversed a Suffolk County Supreme Court decision granting a use variance for a mother-daughter residence in the Village of Patchogue (the “Village”), in spite of statements made on the record by the Zoning Board of Appeals (“ZBA”) Chairman implying prior precedent approving such applications.

In June 2014, the petitioner applied to the Village seeking the conversion of her two-car garage into an apartment for her 81 year old mother of limited financial means.  Unfortunately, Patchogue’s zoning code does not define “mother-daughter” or permit an  “accessory apartment” in its single-family residential zone.  As a result, because such use is prohibited, the petitioner was required to appeal that decision to the ZBA for a use variance pursuant to Village Law 7-712-b(2).

At the public hearing before the ZBA, no one opposed the application, and one neighbor spoke in favor of it.  However, as an apparent precursor to denial, the Chairman stated on the record that “[n]ot many [such applications] have been granted at all.”  Not surprisingly, the ZBA denied petitioner’s application to convert her two-car garage into living space.

The petitioner subsequently commenced an Article 78 to annul the ZBA’s decision as arbitrary and capricious.  The Chairman’s statement later became the focal point for petitioner’s argument that prior alleged precedent effectively mandated the ZBA approve petitioner’s garage conversion.

Later that year, the Supreme Court annulled the ZBA’s denial as arbitrary and capricious for failing to follow its own precedent.  See Gray v Village of Patchogue Zoning Board of Appeals.  In its decision, the Supreme Court incorrectly implemented the balancing test for an area variance instead of a use variance.  The court appeared to rest its decision heavily on an implied prior precedent based on the Chairman’s above quoted statement.  Based on that statement, the lower court constrained the ZBA to grant the garage conversion, holding that “administrative due process prohibits inconsistent treatment of similarly situated properties”.  Id.

In reversing the Supreme Court’s decision, the Second Department clarified that petitioner’s application was for a use variance.   See Gray v Village of Patchogue Zoning Board of Appeals, 164 AD3d 587 [2d Dept 2018].  The Appellate Division affirmed the ZBA’s denial because the petitioner had failed to satisfy the more onerous “unnecessary hardship” element required for a use variance.   More importantly, the Appellate Division determined that there was no evidence that the ZBA failed to adhere to prior precedent.  Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the Board provided a rational explanation for reaching a different result.

Accordingly, this decision should serve as a cautionary tale for applicants and practitioners to not place too much stock on prior approvals by municipal boards.  Although precedent is important, each property is different and may yield a different result.

 

 

On October 17, 2018, the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department (“Second Department”) issued two (2) companion decisions arising out of three different attempts by Petitioners, Kleinknechts (“Petitioners”)  to construct a dock at their waterfront property.  Each of the attempts resulted in a Supreme Court litigation.  As we blog about these cases today, no dock has been constructed despite a directive in 2013 that a permit be issued upon submission of the proper application!

In the first matter, the Second Department upheld a decision of the Village of Lloyd Harbor’s Zoning Board of Appeals (“ZBA”) denying certain variances requested by Petitioners to construct a dock along their waterfront property finding that the ZBA properly applied the five-factor test set forth in Village Law 7-712-b(3).  Further,  Petitioners’ expert testified that he had prepared an alternative completely code compliant plan.  Since a code compliant dock plan provided a reasonable alternative for Petitioners to explore, the Second Department upheld the trial court’s dismissal of the underlying Article 78 proceeding stating that the “need” for the variances was self-created.  In light of the ZBA’s proper application of Village Law, the ZBA’s denial was not arbitrary or capricious.  See, Kleinknecht v. Brogan, 2018 WL 5020285 (Oct. 17, 2018)

In the second matter, and following denial of the above-mentioned variance application, the Appellate Division vacated a 2013 directive to the Building Inspector requiring the Building Inspector to issue a building permit to Petitioners for the alternative code compliant dock permit application.  The Second Department stated “[m]andamus . . . is an extraordinary remedy that, by definition, is available only in limited circumstances.”  “A party seeking mandamus must show a ‘clear legal right’ to [the] relief [requested]'”  Here, no clear legal right existed.  See, Kleinknecht v. Siino, 2018 WL 5020282 (2018).

Prior to 2013, Petitioners’ property was subject to an open space easement precluding construction of a dock at the property.  Petitioners commenced an action seeking to have the open space easement extinguished.  The trial court issued a judgment holding that the open space easement was no longer necessary and directed that the Building Inspector issue a building permit to Petitioners upon submission of the “required” application.  The Village did not appeal the judgment.

As such, upon submission of a code compliant building permit application (as noted above an application for variances was denied and upheld), Petitioners sought an approved building permit.  Although the Second Department held that the Building Inspector had no basis to deny issuing the permit based on the existence of the open space easement, the Second Department did vacate the 2013 trial court directive to issue a permit upon submission of the “required” application stating that the Village Code requires every Village building permit application be referred to the “Site and Building Permit Review Board” (“Review Board”).  Finding that the trial court’s directive to the Building Inspector bypassed a necessary referral step to the Review Board, the Second Department ordered the Building Inspector to refer Petitioners’ application to the Review Board.   The Second Department did not then direct the Building Inspector to issue a building permit to Petitioners if the Review Board approves that application..

Instead, the Second Department decision states “[t]he Building Inspector may issue a building permit only upon approval by the” Review Board.  As a litigation and land use attorney,  it has become painfully apparent that courts do not always weigh the import of the language used when crafting relief for the parties.   Maybe it is of little consequence that the Second Department said that the Building Inspector “may” approve the building permit if approved by the Review Board.  However, it would  provide the Petitioners, and their attorney(s), greater comfort and certainty if the chosen words were “must” approve the building permit, instead of “may” approve the building permit.

 

A use variance is arguably one of the most difficult zoning approvals to obtain and is rarely granted.  Petitioners in 54 Marion Ave., LLC v. City of Saratoga Springs, 2018 N.Y. Slip Op. 04611, 162 A.D.3d 1341 (3d Dep’t 2018),  commenced a hybrid proceeding/action to challenge and annul a determination of the Zoning Board of Appeals (“ZBA“) of City of Saratoga Spring (“City”) to deny  a use variance application to allow commercial use of residential property and for Section 1983 damages based upon the theory of regulatory taking. The Respondents moved to dismiss and the Supreme Court, Saratoga County (“Motion Court“), granted the motion. Petitioners appealed and the Appellate Division, Third Department (“Appeals Court“), reversed in part and affirmed in part, and found hardship which was not self-created.

Petitioner 54 Marion Avenue, LLC (“Owner“) owns a vacant parcel of real property situated in the City’s Urban Residential-2 District, where single-family residences are permitted as of right, where other uses are allowed with a special use permit and site plan review and where commercial uses are generally prohibited. Petitioner Maple Shade Corners, LLC (“Purchaser“) contracted to purchase the subject parcel contingent upon obtaining a use variance to allow a dental practice to operate thereon. An application was made to the ZBA for a use variance to allow the dental practice in Urban Residential-2 and the ZBA denied the application because the alleged hardship was not unique and was self-created. Petitioners brought this litigation to annul the ZBA’s decision denying the use variance and to seek damages for regulatory taking. Respondents moved to dismiss based upon Petitioners’ failure to state a cause of action, which the Motion Court granted.

In order to qualify for a use variance, an applicant must meet the very difficult task of demonstrating the following four elements: (i) it cannot realize a reasonable return if the property is used for a permitted purpose; (ii) the hardship results from unique characteristics of the property; (iii) the proposed use will not alter the essential character of the neighborhood; and (iv) the hardship has not been self-created. The ZBA found that the Petitioner met the first and third elements, but failed to meet the second and fourth elements – that the hardship was unique and was not self-created. On appeal, the Appeals Court reversed the Motion Court as to the hardship issues.

In its review of the ZBA’s determination, the Appeals Court noted that the subject property lies next to the intersection of a major thoroughfare and a side street. Petitioners substantiated their claim that this location imposes a unique financial hardship because of the commercial development and increasing traffic along the thoroughfare (occurring over the prior 30 years) with statements from prior owners and real estate professionals.  These statements recounted previous failed attempts to sell the subject parcel for permitted residential use and opined its location rendered it unmarketable for residential use, among other things. In light of this proof, the Appeals Court found that the need for a use variance was not self-created because it only arose after the property was acquired and due to the gradual shift in the character of the area, which rendered the residential use requirement onerous and obsolete. Moreover, the Appeals Court noted that even the ZBA agreed the location of the parcel on the corner might impact its value; the ZBA’s ultimate conclusion that the financial hardship was not unique was contrary to that observation. On a motion to dismiss, Courts must accept the allegations presented as true and, based upon the foregoing, the Appeals Court held that Petitioners set forth a viable challenge to the ZBA’s denial and reversed the Motion Court.

With respect to the regulatory taking claim, the Appellate Division affirmed dismissal. In order for a taking claim to be ripe, a claimant must demonstrate that it has received a final decision regarding the application of the challenged regulations to the subject property from the governing entity and that it has sought compensation through the appropriate state procedures. Although the ZBA’s denial of the use variance satisfied the final decision prong, the Appeals Court found that there is no indication the Petitioners sought compensation under State law.